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THE JUDGE AND THE DRONE
Justin Desautels-Stein*

Among the most characteristic issues in modern jurisprudence is the distinction
between adjudication and legislation. In the some accounts, a judge's role in
deciding a particular controversy is highly constrained and limited to the
application of preexisting law. Whereas legislation is inescapably political,
adjudicationrequires at least some form of impersonal neutrality.In various ways
over the past century, theorists have pressed this conventional account,
complicating the conceptual underpinnings of the distinction between lawapplicationand lawmaking. This Article contributes to this literatureon the nature
of adjudication through the resuscitation of a structuralist mode of legal
interpretation.In the structuralistview, the distinction between adjudication and
legislation has little to do with so-called neutral law application and political
lawmaking. At the same time, and perhaps surprisingly, structuralists do not
assume that adjudication is wholly subjective either. Rather, structuralists view
judicial practice as at once constrained and discretionary, emerging only in the
navigation of the syntactic and tropological structures of legal language. The
judge is certainlyfree to speak the law in myriad ways, but just as critically, the
particularlylegal forms in which the judge may speak are always limited by the
language of law itself In order to demonstrate this structuralistmode of legal
interpretation,I apply it to an emerging and hotly debatedfield of law known as
the law of killing. Within internationallaw 's rules regulating the use offorce, the
law of killing is most commonly associatedwith the legality of drone strikes in the
context of the U.S. Administration's ongoingfight with al Qaeda and "associated
forces." Structuralism does not help us figure out whether drone strikes in any
given instance are legal. But it does help us understand the patterns of legal

*
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part of a series on legal structuralism, including The Tragedy of Legal Structuralism, 78
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reasoningthat assist in giving certain strikes a gloss of legal necessity, as well as
those patterns that do not.
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INTRODUCTION
Embracing one of the most popular jurisprudential tactics of the 20th
century, Ronald Dworkin's Law 's Empire begins with a critique of positivism.1 In
Dworkin's view, positivism failed to address the now well-known problem of
"theoretical disagreement about the law." 2 A theoretical disagreement arises when
judges are at odds with respect to the relevant lines of prcedent or the3
interpretation of statutes: what Dworkin called the "grounds of decision.
Positivists, Dworkin explained, missed this systemic dimension of legal
1.
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 1 (1986). The literature on legal
positivism is massive. For some of the best-known discussions, see JOHN AUSTIN, THE
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE

(Hackett Publ'g Co. 1998) (1832); HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE

(1945); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593 (1958). Along with Dworkin's work, famous criticisms include JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL

LAW & NATURAL RIGHTS (2d ed., 2011); Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: a
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REV. 630 (1958); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and
PurposeofSociologicalJurisprudence,24 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911).
2.
DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 5. For discussion, see, e.g., SCOTT SHAPIRO,
LEGALITY 282 (2011); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).

3.

DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 5-6.
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disagreements-and as a consequence, law writ large-because they adhered to an
old-fashioned and formalistic idea about judges working under the hard constraints
of a law that preceded their decisions.4 In this view, judges simply apply the law,
they do not make it, and adjudication is only ideological when something has gone
wrong.5 If judicial work does happen to breach this barrier between law
application and creation, the result is "judicial activism": the usurpation of
legislative authority. 6 If judges disagree about the relevant lines of precedent or
how to interpret the statute, then, at least most of the time, one of them is just
mistaken.'
While I enjoy a good trashing of positivism as much as anybody, I do not
believe that Dworkin avoided the problems he set out to resolve.8 But I do think
Dworkin was on to something, and it was the idea that law is, at its core,
argumentative.' This perspective concedes that law is relatively indeterminate 0
and that judges in fact have much more legitimate discretion to decide than the
positivists were ready to admit.11 In this, I completely agree.12 But Dworkin's
difficulty, as pointed out repeatedly by Stanley Fish, lay in the manner in which
Dworkin tried to ultimately exclude ideological influence and bring judicial
constraints back into the picture.13 Or, in other words, Dworkin's realization that
4.

A common example of formalism in this sense is JOSEPH BEALE, SELECTIONS
21-25 (1935).
See, e.g., Owen Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 11-13

FROM BEALE'S TREATISE ON THE CONFLICTS

5.
(1986).

6.

A different but related concern is Bickel's "counter-majoritarian difficulty."
16 (2d ed. 1986). See also Jeremy

ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH

Waldron, The Core of the Case Against JudicialReview, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1349 (2006).
7.
See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 6 (2012).
8.
See also Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L.
REv. 801 (1991).
9.
DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 13 ("Legal practice, unlike many other social
phenomena, is argumentative. Every actor in the practice understands that what it permits or
requires depends on the truth of certain propositions that are given sense only by and within
the practice; the practice consists in large part in deploying and arguing about these
propositions. People who have law make and debate their claims about what law permits or
forbids that would be impossible-because senseless-without law and a good part of what
their law reveals about them cannot be discovered except by noticing how they ground and
defend these claims.").
10.
Id. at 87-88 ("Each judge's interpretive theories are grounded in his own
convictions about the 'point'-the justifying purpose or goal or principle-of legal practice
as a whole, and these convictions will inevitably be different, at least in detail, from those
other judges. Nevertheless, a variety of forces tempers these differences and conspires
toward convergence.").
11.
For an example of the realist version of this critique, see WALTER WHEELER
COOK, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF CONFLICTS OF LAW 1-47 (1942).
12.
And, to be fair, many positivists would also point out that positivism is far
more sophisticated than Dworkin realized. See SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 357-59.
13.
As Fish has suggested, "it is neither the case that interpretation is constrained
by what is obviously and unproblematically 'there,' nor the case that interpreters, in the
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positivists failed to appreciate the reality of law as an argumentative practice was a
really good one. Where Dworkin faltered was in his explanation of how the
construction of argumentative patterns actually works, and more specifically, how
he characterized the constraints he believed to work upon the interpretive
negotiation of theoretical disagreement."
For Dworkin, these constraints rescued judicial interpretation from the
problem of "radical indeterminacy" sometimes associated with critical legal
studies." While Dworkin believed that law was essentially argumentative, he also
believed that, in the end, a judge's interpretive work could emerge free and clear of
ideological content.16 This, of course, is the role of Dworkin's principle of
integrity. 17 If done correctly, Dworkin promised, judges avoid the ideologically
motivated mistakes of judicial activism and decide hard cases in the light of moral
ideals existing independently of the judge's own partisan preferences.
Dworkin's theory of legal argument thus at once embraced the relatively
indeterminate nature of "theoretical disagreements about law" only to ultimately
produce a view of law that demoted that indeterminacy to the work of
ideologically motivated judges.19
In this Article, I adopt Dworkin's basic postulate of law as argumentative
in character, but reject his theory of interpretive constraints. Also, like Dworkin,
my view of law as a field of argument rejects the positivist distinction between law
and morality, though I also reject Dworkin's way of reconceptualizing that
distinction. In the pages that follow, I outline a structuralist approach to the
interpretive practice of judicial work.20 Legal structuralism views a legal system
as a language, and just like any language, it is a system that at once offers the
speaker (the judge) a great deal of discretion about what may be justifiably said,
and also constrains the speaker (the judge) with respect to the forms in which
statements may be made. Thus, like Dworkin, legal structuralists agree that law is
a highly discretionary and a relatively indeterminate form of argumentative
practice.21 But, unlike Dworkin's belief that indeterminacy was disciplined
through the influence of moral principles working independently of judicial
absence of such constraints, are free to read into a text whatever they like . . . ." STANLEY
FISH, DOING WHAT CoMEs NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY
IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 97 (1995).
14.
Id. at 105. See also DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 117-

30 (1997).
15.
DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 271-75.
16.
Id. at 270-71.
17.
Id. at 225 ("According to law as integrity, propositions of law are true if they
figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process that
provide the best constructive interpretation of the conununity's legal practice.").
18.
Id. at 255-56.
19.
Duncan Kennedy, The Hermeneutic of Suspicion in ContemporaryAmerican
Legal Thought, 25 L. & CRITIQUE (forthcoming 2014).
20.
See also Justin Desautels-Stein, Back in Style, 25 L. & CRITIQUE
(forthcoming 2014).
21.
Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J.LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986).
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discretion, legal structuralism suggests that radical indeterminacy is disciplined
through the grammatical structure of legal argument itself. The constraints do not
come from the outside, as Dworkin would have had it-they are already built in.22
In Part I, I build a view of structuralist interpretation from the ground up.
It begins in Section A with a brief survey of structuralism's basic assumptions as
they developed in linguistics, social theory, and literary theory. In Section B, the
discussion then illustrates these ideas through Hayden White's structuralist
analysis of the distinction between history and literature.23 This analysis is an
especially helpful prelude for thinking about the distinction between law and
politics, because White's description of the historian's approach to the "materials"
are directly analogous to the description of the judge's approach to legal material.
It is here, in Section C, that the Article comes back explicitly to the problem of
freedom and constraint in judicial work, and I argue for a structuralist
understanding of legal interpretation. Section D brings more specificity to the
nature of legal structuralism by focusing on the illustrative field of international
law.
This structuralist view of international law sets up the organizing question
for Part II. Here, I ask how a structuralist mode of legal interpretation applies to
the domain of international law known as the law of killing and the specific
example of drone strikes.24 To use Dworkin's phrasing, we could ask, "what is the
nature of theoretical disagreements about the legality of drone strikes under
international law?" However, rather than resort to Dworkin's Herculean approach,
I apply a structuralist approach animated by the work of Hayden White, Mark
Kelman, and Pierre Schlag. In Section A, I outline four intellectual orientations
from which a judge might adjudicate the legality of a drone strike under
international law: realism, communitarianism, individualism, and statism. I cast
these orientations as interpretive positions a judge is unavoidably obliged to
employ. Each of these orientations provides the judge with a prefiguration of the
legal materials, which has the consequence of fitting certain interpretations and
conclusions with a sense of legal necessity. In Section B, I contrast these
interpretive orientations with two explanatory frameworks. In contrast to the
deeper and more foundational nature of the prefiguring orientation, a judge's
choice of one explanatory framework over another involves the narrative structure
into which the legal materials are placed. Thus, while the orientation sets the
ground rules for the story, the narrative has to do with the sort of explanation the
judge will make out of the legal material. I call these two explanatory frameworks
the "Charter Peacetime" framework and the "Charter Wartime" framework.

22.
Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and
Literature,60 TEx. L. REv. 551, 562 (1982).
23.
HAYDEN WHITE, CONTENT OF THE FORM: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND
HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION 40-41 (1987) [hereinafter WHITE, CONTENT].
24.
See, e.g., TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL
WORLD (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012) [hereinafter
TARGETED KILLINGS].
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Part III explores the structuralist approach to drones in the context of a
hypothetical adjudication. Section A begins with a return to the problem of legal
interpretation and the issue of freedom and constraint in judicial work. The
discussion illustrates the issue through a debate between two fictional judges, both
of which Dworkin targeted in Law 's Empire.2 5 The first position is exemplified by
a positivist judge, while the second is represented by a pragmatist judge. Building
explicitly off of Duncan Kennedy's work, Section B contrasts these two judicial
approaches with the structuralist or ironic mode of interpretation. The vehicle for
the discussion is a hypothetical adjudication of a U.S. drone strike and the
incidental killing of a U.S. citizen in Egypt.
I. STRUCTURALISM
In this Part, I offer a structuralist style of interpretive practice.26
Structuralism begins with semiotics.27 A semiotic approach understands language
as a system of signs.28 Legal structuralism, in turn, explores the structure of "law"
as a language-system, in much the same way that a linguist studies the structure of
English as a language-system. In other words, legal structuralism takes a semiotic
approach to law.29 Legal structuralism presents the analyst with a style for
evaluating the interpretive practice of judges,30 but it does not provide the analyst

25.
DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 114-75.
26.
See generally 1-4 JONATHAN CULLER, STRUCTURALISM: CRITICAL CONCEPTS
(2006); TERENCE HAWKES, STRUCTURALISM AND SEMIOTICS (2003). There are, of course,
many varieties of legal interpretation. Since the early 1980s, legal scholarship has steadily
addressed the problem of interpretation. For some representative discussions, see Owen
Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1985); Owen Fiss, Objectivity and
Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); David Couzens Hoy, Interpreting the Law:
Hermeneutical and PoststructuralistPerspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 135 (1985); David
Kennedy, The Turn to Interpretation,58 S. CAL. L. REV. 251 (1985); Sanford Levinson, Law
as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1982); G. Edward White, The Text, Interpretation, and
Critical Standards, 60 TEx. L. REV. 569 (1982); James Boyd White, Law as Language:
Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 415 (1982). For more recent
discussions, see INTERPRETATION, LAW, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF MEANING (Anne
Wagner, Wouter Werner & Deborah Cao eds., 2007); PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
LANGUAGE IN THE LAW (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011); Peter Fitzpatrick,
Reading Slowly: The Law of Literature and the Literature of Law, in READING MODERN
LAW: CRITICAL METHODOLOGIES AND SOVEREIGN FORMATIONS (Ruth Buchanan, Stewart
Motha & Sundhya Pahuja eds., 2012).
27.
See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL REASONING (2008).
28.
See infra notes 38-99.
29.
See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT (2006); Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics ofLegal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV.
75 (1991). Other literatures are relevant to the larger discussion of the philosophy of
language, but I bracket them out in the context of this Article's discussion. See, e.g., J.L.
AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1975); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS (2009).
30.
"The word tropic derives from tropikos, tropos, which in Classical Greek
meant 'turn' and in Koine 'way' or 'manner.' It comes into modern Indo-European
languages by way of tropus, which in classical Latin meant 'metaphor' or 'figure of speech'
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with a way of distinguishing between interpretations of legal materials.
Structuralism does not, for example, say anything about whether Antonin Scalia or
Richard Posner has the better interpretation of the Voting Rights Act,31 or whether
drone strikes are a valid use of force under international law.32 But if structuralism
is silent on such critical questions, of what use could it possibly be?
As the structuralist historian Hayden White has argued, there are several
"tropological"33 levels of interpretive practice in a given historical account.34 There
is the level at which the historian unconsciously deploys a style of organizing the
universe of archival material. There is also the level at which she semiconsciously
"chooses" an explanatory mode for the materials that she has selected. There is the
more conscious "rhetorical" mode in which she decides what sort of narrative form
the explanation will take.35 Finally, there's the conclusion in which the historian
constructs the bottom line-the takeaway that makes the historical account worth
pondering. Legal structuralists provide a similar account of law.
True, the structuralist never gets to the merits. Structuralism will not help
us understand who is somehow "right" in the fight over same-sex marriage or
campaign finance reform. But what it does help us understand is how a conclusion
in one of these debates takes on a sense of legal necessity-why it was that this

and in Late Latin, especially as applied to music theory, 'mood' or 'measure.' All of these
meanings, sedimented in the early English word trope, capture the force of the concept that
modern English intends by the word style, a concept that is especially apt for the
consideration of that form of verbal composition which, in order to distinguish it from
logical demonstration on the one side and from pure fiction on the other, we call by the
name discourse." HAYDEN WHITE, TROPICS OF DISCOURSE: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL CRITICISM
2 (1978) [hereinafter WHITE, TROPICS].
31.
Posner criticized the majority opinion in Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct.
2612 (2013), which Justice Scalia joined, in Richard A. Posner, The Voting Rights Act
Ruling Is About the Conservative Imagination, SLATE (June 26, 2013, 12:16 AM),
http://www.slate.conarticles/newsandpolitics/the-breakfast-table/features/2013/supreme
court 2013/thesupremecourt and the votingrights act strikingdown the law is all.
html.
32.

See infra notes 271-362.

33.
Tropology provides "a perspective on language from which to analyze the
elements, levels, and combinatorial procedures of nonformalized, and especially pragmatic
discourses. Tropology centers attention on the turns in a discourse: turns from one
generalization to another, from one phase of a sequence to another, from a description to an
analysis or the reverse . . . In complex discourses such as those met with in historiography
or indeed any of the human sciences, the rules of discourse formation are not fixed ... This
is why efforts to construct a logic or even a gramnar of narrative have failed. But the turns
can be identified, classified as types, and generic patterns of their typical orders of
occurrence in specific discourses established." HAYDEN WHITE, FIGURAL REALISM: STUDIES
INTHE MIMESIS EFFECT 10-11 (1999) [hereinafter WHITE, FIGURAL].
34.
White's major work is HAYDEN WHITE, METAHISTORY: THE HISTORICAL
IMAGINATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY EUROPE (1973) [hereinafter WHITE, METAHISTORY].

35.

For introductory discussions of the relation between rhetoric and semiotics,

see DANIEL CHANDLER, SEMIOTICS: TE BASICS (2007); WINFRIED NOTH, HANDBOOK OF

SEMIOTICS (1990).
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rather than that conclusion was the right one.36 What are the intellectual
orientations that tend to organize the field of discourse? What modes of
explanation make possible the debate over whether the text carries meaning
independently of the reader? What are the basic grammatical rules of the legal
lexicon which constitute that debate? Why is it that our legal conclusions so often
seem the product of an arrested imagination, perpetually delimiting new and
experimentalist possibilities? It is to these questions that legal structuralism
proposes answers. While it would be careless, if not downright irresponsible, to
suggest that the legal conclusions do not matter, the legal structuralist is focused
instead on the styles of legal discourse that constitute the possibilities for
generating the form of the conclusions in the first place.3 7
In order to more fully develop this view of structuralist interpretation, this
Part progresses in four sections. Section A briefly explains Ferdinand de
Saussure's theory of semiotics and Claude Levi-Strauss's use of semiotics in his
structuralist anthropology. This Section also introduces a common example of the
deconstructionist critique of structuralism in Paul de Man's essay on the relation
between semiotics and rhetoric. Section B pushes past de Man and offers Hayden
White's theory of historiography as a style of merging semiotics and rhetoric in the
shadow of deconstruction. Section C brings White's analysis of the conventional
distinction between history and literature to the more familiar distinction between
law and politics, arguing for a structuralist perspective on law, in which the form
of legal texts are governed by a deep grammar, and patterned through recurring
rhetorical grooves. By way of illustration, Section D brings legal structuralism to
international law.
A. Semiotics and Rhetoric
At the center of structuralism is Ferdinand de Saussure and the field of
semiotics-the study of language as a system of signs.38 Three of Saussure's
36.
For a recent discussion of this point, see Kennedy, supra note 19.
37.
Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEx. L.
REV. 1195, 1243 (1989) ("[T]he typical supposition within the legal community that
intellectual endeavor can and must converge in 'points' or 'solutions' or 'ideas'-or
'conclusions'-has a real tendency to kill thought. When the metamorphosis from thought
to conclusion is complete, thought is ensconced in a safe objectified form-distinct from the
thinker and always ready for rapid professional deployment. This tendency to reduce
thought to conclusions-to mere ideas-is, of course, characteristic of rationalism. And
much of this Article has been an attempt to show that this very way of conceptualizing
thought (or anything else) often results in serious misunderstanding. This rationalist
misunderstanding has a systematic character-one which is thus intelligible. Indeed, the
systematic character of rationalist misunderstanding turns out to be the very technique by
which rationalism sustains itself as a viable cognitive orientation.").
38.
1 FRANCOIS DOSSE, HISTORY OF STRUCTURALISM: THE RISING OF THE SIGN,
1945-1966, at 45 (Deborah Glassman trans., University of Michigan Press 1997) (1991)
("In order to understand the structuralist paradigm, therefore, we have to begin with the
Saussurean break, since an entire generation read and considered [Saussure's Course on
General Linguistics] to be the founding moment."); CRITICAL THEORY: A READER 11
(Douglas Tallack ed., 1995) [hereinafter CRITICAL THEORY READER] ("In the 1960s
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seniotic distinctions are relevant here: (1) signifier/signified; (2) langue/parole;
and (3) synchronic/diachronic. In contrast to earlier work in linguistics, 39 Saussure
believed that a sign was composed of two elements,40 neither of which was
necessarily tethered to an objective description of a world independent of
linguistic experience." For instance, the function of the word "apple" is not to
describe that piece of fruit;42 the relation between "apple" and the fruit is
arbitrary.4 3 We might as well use ping guo or clernz. Either would do the trick.
Saussure suggested that the English utterance of "apple" is merely a material
signifier (a "sound-image") for the immaterial concept of an apple floating around
in your head-the signified. 4 When the signifier and signified unite in the course
of a communication, a sign is formed. 5 Because of this arbitrary relation between
signified and signifier, the meaning of the communication only becomes available
through the act of distinguishing one sign from another, of creating difference
between signs.46 In other words, we only rarely encounter the meaning of an
utterance because the sound of the word has some intrinsic connection with the
concept the word is meant to designate. More typically, we encounter the meaning
in a relational way. In the English language, we get more of the meaning of
"apple" by distinguishing it from "ape" or "leap" or "people" or "orange," and less

Saussure's model of language became paradigmatic for a number of important structuralist
ventures which sought to analyze systems of signs of fashion, advertising, narrative and
poetry, and whole cultures .... ); Jean-Michel Rabatd, Introduction to JOHN STURROCK,
6-10 (2003).
39.
FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 1-5 (Wade
Baskin trans., Charles Bally & Albert Sechehaye eds., 1959).
40.
Id at 65-70.
41.
Id at 113 ("Not only are the two domains that are linked by the linguistic
fact shapeless and confused, but the choice of a given slice of sound to name a given idea is
completely arbitrary. If this were not true, the notion of value would be compromised, for it
would include an externally imposed element. But actually values remain entirely relative,
and that is why the bond between the sound and the idea is radically arbitrary.").
42.
Id at 66 ("The linguistic sign unites not a thing and a name, but a concept
and a sound-image."). Contrast this view with Thoreau's description of a "leaf." CRITICAL
THEORY READER, supra note 38, at 13 ("No wonder the earth expresses itself outwardly in
leaves, it so labors with the idea inwardly .... The overhanging leaf sees its prototype.
Internally, whether in the globe or animal body, it is a moist thick lobe, a word especially
applicable to the liver and lungs and the leaves of fat (... globus, lobe, globe; also lap, flap,
and many other words); externally, a dry thin leaf, even as the f and v are a pressed and
dried b. The radicals of lobe are lb, the soft mass of the b (single-lobed or B, double-lobed),
with the liquid 1behind it pressing forward.").
43.
SAUSSURE, supra note 39, at 68.
STRUCTURALISM

44.

Id

45.
Id at 67.
46.
Id. at 103 ("The linguistic entity is not accurately defined until it is delimited,
i.e. separated from everything that surrounds it on the phonic chain. These delimited entities

or units stand in opposition to each other in the mechanism of language.");
note 26, at 11.

HAWKES,

supra
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from some inherent or natural connection between "apple" and the conception of
apple.47
But Saussure's idea here was not merely that different languages assign
different signs to preexisting conceptions. His idea went considerably further,
suggesting that different languages actually construct the concepts differently as
well, i.e., "apple" (the "sound-image") as well as apple (the concept).48 That is, the
signified concepts shift between languages, and over time, within languages as
well. 49 There is no inherent core of meaning in a concept, and no inherent way of
signifying it. The relation between signifieds and signifiers is arbitrary and
relational, in both directions: its sound-images are arbitrary, and the way a
language constructs and organizes the world through its signifieds is arbitrary as
well.o
The arbitrary nature of language feeds into the arguably contradictory
idea that languages are, nevertheless, systemic.5 1 Saussure's theory of the
language-system unpacks in his well-known distinction between langue and
parole.5 2 Langue refers to the fundamental syntactical rules shaping the contours
and boundaries of the linguistic structure.53 As Saussure explained, the langue
represents "the whole set of linguistic habits which allow an individual to
understand and be understood." 4 The langue is consequently social in nature,
meaning that it is shared by everyone partaking in the language-system." It is also
determinate in scope. The langue is a system of constraints operating equally on
each language speaker. Its contents are fixed and closed, and in the context of the
system, universal.5 6 In order for the system to function, people cannot just make up
their own rules of grammar willy-nilly. 7
People can, however, say almost anything they like so long as they are
operating within the constraints of the langue. This highly discretionary surface
level of language is parole, which refers to the open, arbitrary, and individually
created combinations of speech-acts made in light of the deep structure of the

47.
48.
49.

SAUSSURE, supra note 39, at 67.
Id at 12.
There is a helpful discussion of this point in JONATHAN CULLER, FERDINAND
DE SAUSSURE 39-45 (1986).
50.
Id at 33-34.
51.
HAWKES, supra note 26, at 9.
52.
SAUSSURE, supra note 39, at 9.
Id
53.
54.
Id at 77.
Id
55.
56.
Id at 73. ("A language constitutes a system. In this one respect ... language
is not completely arbitrary but is ruled to some extent by logic; it is here also, however, that
the inability of the masses to transform it becomes apparent. The system is a complex
mechanism that can be grasped only through reflection; the very ones who use it daily are
ignorant of it.").
57.
This is the point made famous in Wittgenstein's notion of "private
language." LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1953).
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langue." Thus, where langue is unconscious and out of sight, parole is intentional
and visible. Where langue is syntax, parole is utterance. Where langue represents
a field of coercion, parole is free. Where parole is apparent and everywhere,
langue is only discoverable through an analysis of the common qualities
demonstrable in parole.5 9
If langue is only discoverable through a study of parole, how is the study
to be conducted? Is it done historically, looking at the development of English, or
fashion, or whatever, over time? How much time? How do we fix the limits of
study? It is here that Saussure's third distinction comes in, the distinction between
synchronic and diachronic analysis.60 For some, this was the only way to
understand how languages formed, through historical, functionalist, and
evolutionary treatments of the way in which language changed over time. This
kind of effort is notable for a search for the origin, where it all started, and what
happened from there. This is diachronic analysis, the study of a system in
chronological form.61 In contrast was his preferred synchronic approach. In this
ahistorical mode, the linguistic structure is studied at a snapshot in time.62 We do
not bother with how the sign came to appear or with the curiosity that it "meant"
one thing only later to "mean" something entirely different. The absolutely
arbitrary nature of the sign suggested that it could only be studied in its relational
dynamic in a frozen state. This was not because Saussure thought history
unimportant; it was because he believed that given the constantly changing nature
of signs in history, they could only be understood in relation to other signs in a
particular and momentary system.63 To know the langue, it must be studied
synchronically as an operating system. To critique the langue, we can compare its
different manifestations diachronically, over time.64

58.
SAUSSURE, supra note 39, at 76 ("Nothing could be more complex [than the
way in which language evolves]. As it is a product of both the social force and time, no one
can change anything in it, and on the other hand, the arbitrariness of its signs theoretically
entails the freedom of establishing just any relationship between phonetic substance and
ideas.").
59.
ROSALIND COWARD & JOHN ELLIS, LANGUAGE AND MATERIALISM:
DEVELOPMENTS INSEMIOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF THE SUBJECT 12 (1977) ("The speech act
is only comprehensible on the basis of the whole system from which it gains its validity;
and the system itself only exists in the multitude of speech acts. The structure of language is
the systematicity which informs every individual act of speech: it is a system which can be
constructed by an analyst but has no concrete existence as such.").
60.
SAUSSURE, supra note 39, at 79-100.
61.
Id.
62.
Id. at 82.
63.
Id. at 80.
64.
To be sure, Saussure recognized that the agent's use of parole necessarily
changes the langue over time. But the structuralist method, in its search for a total
understanding of the system, bracketed out the agent and the influence of parole in favor of
a static and relational analysis of the system. Thus, language was to be explained neither by
the "real" world to which language seemed to be related, nor by the agent's operation of the
language over time. Explanation followed purely through reference to relations between the
relevant terms. For a discussion of the problem of a metaphysics of presence, which seems
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Building out from this Saussurean baseline, we get to structuralism.65
Claude Levi-Strauss described the project as an investigation into "whether the
different aspects of social life (including even art and religion) cannot only be
studied by the methods of, and with the help of concepts similar to those employed
in, linguistics, but also whether they do not constitute phenomena whose inmost
nature is the same as that of language." 6 6 Thus, narrative, cuisine, or law might
each be understood as a distinct "language-system." 67 The structuralist method
involved the targeting of a field, an isolation of the "units" comprising the field,
and the search for commonalities underlying them. 68 In his study of myth, for
example, Levi-Strauss argued that each historical/cultural iteration of, say, the
Oedipus myth, could be interpreted as simply one particular performance (parole)
of a universal grammar (langue) constituting the deep structure of the Oedipus
"language-system." 69 The form of any given myth was governed by unconscious
rule-structures, and the job of the anthropologist was to root them out.7 0 What
might therefore appear to be a random mass of arbitrary practices could be
reconstructed as parole.7 1 Underlying the parole, and indeed generating the
specific instances of myth telling, was a langue comprised of universal themes. 72
These universal themes governed the way in which specific myths might be
articulated in much the same way that the rules of syntax govern particular
utterances in linguistics. 73 The governing has little to do with the substance of what
is said, but much to do with the way in which it could be said.

like it might be the case here, see Jacque Derrida, Structure, Sign, andPlay in the Discourse
of the Human Sciences, in THE STRUCTURALIST CONTROVERSY: THE LANGUAGES OF
CRITICISM AND THE SCIENCES OF MAN 247 (Richard Mackey & Eugenio Donato eds., 2007).
65.
HAWKES, supra note 26, at 19-20. There are any number of authors one
might choose in going on to a summary presentation of the structuralist approach. Roman
Jakobson, Claude Levi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, Jacque Lacan, Jean Piaget, Louis
Althusser, Paul Ricoeur, and many others fill the typical list. Levi-Strauss is helpful here
because of his contrast with Barthes and Foucault, discussed infra notes 96-97.
66.
CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSs, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 62 (1963).
67.
See CULLER, supra note 26, at 8-9.
68.
See LEVI-STRAUSS, supra note 66, at 21-22.
69.
Id at 209-15.
70.
Id at 230 ("the kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of
modern science . . . the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in
the nature of the things to which it is applied .... In the same way we may be able to show
that the same logical processes operate in myth as in science, and that man has always been
thinking equally well. . . .").
71.
Id at 208 ("Mythology confronts the student with a situation which at first
sight appears contradictory. On the one hand it would seem that in the course of a myth
anything is likely to happen. There is no logic, no continuity.").
72.
Id ("But on the other hand, this apparent arbitrariness is belied by the
astounding similarity between myths collected in widely different regions. Therefore the
problem: If the content of a myth is contingent, how are we going to explain the fact that
myths throughout the world are so similar?").
73.
Id at 2 10-11.
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By the 1970s, structuralism was in trouble.74 An example comes from the
"poststructuralist" critique associated with Paul de Man's influential article,
Semiology and Rhetoric.7 1 In this early illustration of "deconstruction," de Man
criticized structuralists for their
use of grammatical (especially syntactical) structures conjointly
with rhetorical structures, without apparent awareness of
possible

discrepancies

between

them . . .. In their literary

analyses, Barthes, Genette, Todorov, Greimas and their disciples
all simplify and regress from Jacobson in letting grammar and
rhetoric function in perfect continuity, and in passing from
grammatical to rhetorical structures without difficulty or
interruption. Indeed, as the study of granmatical structures is
refined in contemporary theories of generative, transformational,
and distributive grammar, the study of tropes and figures ...
becomes a mere extension of granmatical models, a particular
subset of syntactical relations. 76
De Man did not think that it was a mistake to look for grammatical
structures, but he questioned the legitimacy of including the figures of rhetoric
within the taxonomy of those structures. Say that the structuralist has identified a
langue "underneath" some body of material. Grant the plausibility of this langue
and its capacity for generating formal transformations in parole. But what are we
to make of situations-which de Man believed to be all too common-where the
"granmatical structure" of a poem, or even a single line, is totally unambiguous,
but the presence of vying rhetorical modes yields entirely incompatible readings?78
How can rhetoric "flow" out of the grammar, when the rhetoric is so often capable
of twisting the grammar into contradiction?79 By all appearances, grammar is now
in the service of rhetoric. Where langue was supposedly in the dominant position,
parole now seems to be doing all the talking.
Was it possible that this reversal of fortunes in which rhetoric dominated
grammar was due simply to the fact that, in certain circumstances, one given

74.
2 FRANCOIS DOSSE, HISTORY OF STRUCTURALISM: TE SIGN SETS, 1967PRESENT 281 (1997).
75.
The relation between a rhetorical space and langue was famously critiqued in
PAUL DE MAN, BLINDNESS AND INSIGHT: ESSAYS IN THE RHETORIC OF CONTEMPORARY
CRITICISM (1971); Paul de Man, Semiology and Rhetoric, 3 DIACRITICS 27 (1973)
[hereinafter de Man, Semiology]. For recent discussion, see Don Paul Abbott, Splendor and

Misery: Semiotics and the End ofRhetoric, 24 RHETORICA 303 (2006).
76.
de Man, Semiology, supra note 75, at 28.
77.
Id. At 29-30 ("The grammatical model of the question becomes rhetorical
not when we have, on the one hand, a literal meaning and on the other hand a figural
meaning, but when it is impossible to decide by grammatical or other linguistic devices
which of the two meanings (that can be entirely contradictory) prevails. Rhetoric radically
suspends logic and opens up vertiginous possibilities of referential aberration.").
Id.
78.
79.
Id. at 30.
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rhetorical reading will simply be right in a way that others could not?SO If so, this
would show rhetoric's dominance to be a mere faqade." But for de Man and the
structuralists as well, it was hopeless to suggest that one rhetorical mode was a
better way of manifesting the underlying grammar.82 On the other hand, if such a
prioritization was unavailable, rhetorical structure and grammatical structure
seemed unlikely to line up outside of a dubious "metaphysics of presence,"83
getting us back to de Man's complaint about the structuralist failure to understand
the fungibility of grammar and structure, langue and parole.
To be sure, de Man's point was not to show that rhetoric was somehow
superior to grammar." On the contrary, just as de Man demonstrated the
rhetorization of grammar, he was similarly keen to show us the granmatization of
rhetoric." In a reading of a short passage from Proust's Swann 's Way, de Man
focused on a series of metaphors shot through the text, ranging from butterflies of
light to bubbling brooks of cool air.8 6 The passage, de Man admits, looks like a
feast of tropological discourse in the repeated deployment of dramatized
metaphors. 7 But when pressed, these tropes reveal the metonymic characteristics
of grammar pulsing underneath, where "the mechanical, repetitive aspect of
grammatical forms is shown to be operative in a passage that seemed at first to
celebrate the self-willed and autonomous inventiveness of a subject."" De Man's
purpose here is to show how the subjective flavor of the rhetorical figure can
collapse into the unconscious depth of grammar, just as the automatic quality of
grammar so easily slips back into indeterminacy of rhetorical choice.80 The
difference between grammar and rhetoric, and the sense that the latter might flow
from the former, seems always on the run.90
In the United States, this sort of deconstruction was often heard as
structuralism's death knell.91 But not everyone saw it this way. Jonathan Culler,
for example, consistently argued that it was a mistake to understand what came to
be known as "poststructuralist" approaches to discourse analysis as a rejection of

80.
Id
81.
Id.
82.
Id
83.
Id
84.
Id
85.
Id
86.
Id
87
Id. at 30-31.
88.
Id. at 32.
Id.
89.
90.
Id. at 33. ("We end up therefore, in the case of the rhetorical grammatization
of semiology, just as in the grammatical rhetorization of illocutionary phrases, in the same
state of suspended ignorance. Any question about the rhetorical mode of a literary text is
always a rhetorical question which does not even know whether it is really questioning.").
91.
PETER CAWS, STRUCTURALISM: THE ART OF THE INTELLIGIBLE 2 (1988) ("The
career of the structuralist movement . . .was meteoric: a brilliant streak followed by relative
extinction. It managed to pass from novelty to fashion to cliche in a very few years, with
hardly any interval of mature reflection . . . .")
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structuralist semiotics.99 Rather, Culler suggested that poststructuralism had
merely introduced another family of techniques into the structuralist toolkit, rather
than having demonstrated the impossibility of structuralist work.93 Indeed, the
knee-jerk reaction to read "poststructuralist" analysis as "post" anything relied on
a serious mischaracterization of the supposedly "totalizing" nature of structuralist
analysis.94 Roland Barthes, a figure often thought to represent the shift from
structuralism to poststructuralism in his S/Z,95 is a perfect example of Culler's
point.96 Michel Foucault is as well.97

92.
JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AFTER
STRUCTURALISM 188-89 (1982) ("This does not mean that the notion of the sign could or
should be scrapped; on the contrary, the distinction between what signifies and what is
signified is essential to any thought whatsoever .... There are no final meanings that arrest
the movement of signification . .

.

. The possibility of endless replication is not an accident

that befalls the sign but a constitutive element of its structure, an incompletion without
which the sign would be incomplete .

. .

. The fact that any signified is also in the position

of signifier does not mean that there are no reasons to link a signifier with one signified
rather than another; still less does it suggest, as both hostile and sympathetic critics have
claimed, an absolute priority of the signifier or a definition of the text as a galaxy of
signifiers.").
93.
Id. at 30.
94.
In this sense, I disagree with the conventional attitude towards legal
structuralism as well. See, e.g., GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS 115-16
(1995) ("Duncan Kennedy's article The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, for
example, employed the method of structural anthropology found in the work of Claude
Levi-Strauss .

. .

. By studying the 'twists and turns' of various arguments used by judges

and lawyers at early common law to mediate this fundamental contradiction, Kennedy
offered an explanation of how legal doctrine actually works in practice to legitimate existing
social practices . . . . Early 1980s CLS scholarship typically claimed that a given legal
doctrine was hopelessly trapped [by the fundamental contradiction] . . . . [T]he commitment

to a structuralist and ideological account of law created a dilemma for CLS scholars. In their
early work, as critical legal scholars seemed to say, there was a 'true' and 'essential deep
structure' to the law. As James Boyle explained: 'The structuralist method put critical legal
theorists oddly close to classical doctrinalists such as Samuel Williston. . . .' Classical
doctrinal scholars found the 'true, essential' structure of the law in the natural objective
categories of the common law. Crits in the early 1980s found the 'true, essential' structure
of legal doctrine in the fundamental contradiction . . .. This rendered CLS work subject to
the critique of false essences.").
95.

ROLAND BARTHES, S/Z (1970)

96.
See, e.g., Roland Barthes, Inaugural Lecture, College de France, in A
BARTHES READER 457, 474-75 (Susan Sontag ed., 1982) ("Semiology has a relation to
science, but it is not a discipline .

. .

. What relation? An ancillary relation: it can help

certain sciences, can be their fellow traveler for a while, offering an operational protocol
starting from which each science must specify the difference of its corpus .

. .

. In other

words, semiology is not a grid; it does not permit a direct apprehension of the real through
the imposition of a general transparency which would render it intelligible. It seeks instead
to elicit the real, in places and by moments, and it says that these efforts to elicit the real
are possible without a grid.It is in fact precisely when semiology comes to be a grid that it
elicits nothing at all . . .. The semiologist is, in short, an artist .

..

. He plays with signs as
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In this light, it seems entirely appropriate to regard de Man's form of
discourse analysis as simply one way of doing discourse analysis, rather than as the
end of structuralism.98 Or rather, de Man's analysis suggests that readings
purporting to "get it right" are probably wrong, but so long as we regard discursive
treatments as possibilities, models, and heuristics rather than mirrored
representations of a true reality, deconstructionist and structuralist readings may
live happily ever after, rather than having been fated as archenemies. As a
consequence, we should see de Man's critique as extremely problematic for those
who see semiotics as necessarily wedded to a positivist or apodictic methodology
for uncovering humanity's greatest secrets. Following de Man, it seems more than
plausible that in a great many cases, we might find marginal ideas in a rhetorical
analysis serving to undermine the autonomy of that very analysis, just as the
reverse will happen in a description of grammatical structure. But this is hardly an
immobilizing discovery for the analyst who has already accepted the ironic nature
of the enterprise: This is not a quest for truth. It is a quest for style, and the hope
that in elucidating style in its many structures, we will be all the better for it.99

with a conscious decoy, whose fascination he savors and wants to make others savor and
understand.") (emphasis added).
97.
See CULLER, supra note 26, at 14 ("In fact, many of the positions or claims
associated with post-structuralism are manifest even in the early work of Barthes, Foucault,
and Lacan. These positions include the difficulty for any metalanguage to escape
entanglement in the phenomena it purports to describe, the possibility for texts to create
meaning by violating the conventions that structural analysis seeks to delineate, or the
inappropriateness of positing a complete system, since systems are always changing. Poststructuralism involves not the demonstration of the inadequacies or errors of structuralism
but (a) avoiding structuralist proclamations of this or that new 'science,' and (b)
superimposing on the structuralist project of working out what makes cultural phenomena
possible a meta-investigation of the effects of the concepts and procedures that analysts use.
Post-structuralism may be best understood as the recurrent self-critique of structuralist
analysis, the attempt to expose presuppositions of any analytical procedure."); MICHEL
FOUCAULT, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DISCOURSE ON LANGUAGE (A.M.
Sheridan Smith trans., Routledge 2002) (1969).
98.
WHITE, TROPICS, supra note 30, at 46.
99.
WHITE, CONTENT, supra note 23, at 189. Hayden White has suggested that
there are at least four ways to relate language and reality. "Language can be taken to be (1)
a manifestation of causal relationships governing the world of things in which it arises, in
the mode of an index; (2) a representation of that world, in the mode of an icon (or
mimesis); (3) a symbol of that world, in the mode of an analogue, natural or culturespecific, as the case might be; (4) simply another among those things that populate the
human world, but more specifically a sign system, that is, a code bearing no necessary, or
'motivated,' relation to that which it signifies." Id.
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B. History and Literature
It is here that I want to turn to the historian Hayden White's work on style
and structure.1 0 0 While very much indebted to semiotics and structuralism,10 1
White's work operates on a separate level of analysis, providing cues as to how
speakers orient themselves to the underlying langue and craft their strategies for
speaking it at the level of parole.10 2 Like Barthes10 3 and the philosopher Richard
Rorty,I White's approach began with a rejection of the Enlightenment distinction

100.
A year after de Man published his essay on semiology and rhetoric, White
confronted Jakobson's distinction between metaphor and metonymy-the distinction
deconstructed by de Man. Hayden White, The Historical Text as LiteraryArtifact, 3 CLIO
277 (1974). The takeaway from the exchange is that while there now seems to be a
consensus about the deployment of interpretive techniques in the service of surfacing the
apodictic meaning of texts, this recognition is misunderstood if it is taken to mean that the
tools of rhetoric are useless. Indeed, such a nuanced understanding of the relation between
rhetoric and semiotics is evident as early as Roman Jakobson's famous essay Linguistics
and Poetics, in STYLE AND LANGUAGE 350, 370-71 (Thomas A. Sebok ed., 1960) ("In
poetry where similarity is superindiced upon contiguity, any metonymy is slightly
metaphorical and any metaphor has a metonymical tint. Ambiguity is an intrinsic,
inalienable character of any self-focused message .

. .

. [However,] the supremacy of poetic

function over referential function does not obliterate the reference but makes it
ambiguous."). Of course, it is true that the vast field of stylistics has not consistently
adhered to Jacobson and White's epistemological posture. The fascination of stylisticians
with objectivity and empiricism remains, though it is, to be sure, complicated. See, e.g., Ray
MacKay, Mything the Point: A Critique of Objective Stylistics, 16 LANGUAGE &
COMMUNICATION 81 (1996); M. Short et al., Stylistics, Criticism, and Myth-Representation
Again: Squaring the Circle with Ray Mackay's Subjective Solution for All Problems, 7
LANGUAGE & LITERATURE 40 (1998).
101.
See, e.g., WHITE, METAHISTORY, supra note 34, at 31. Of course, as is typical
of almost every structuralist I have ever encountered, White takes what he needs and rejects
what he does not. He is no "disciple." For example, White explained, "I have also profited
from a reading of the French Structuralist critics: Lucien Goldmarn, Roland Barthes,
Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida. I should like to stress, however, that I regard the
latter as being, in general, captives of tropological strategies of interpretation in the same
way that their nineteenth-century counterparts were." Id. at 3. On my reading, White
believed this more the case with Foucault than with Barthes. See Hayden White, Foucault
Decoded: Notes from Underground, 12 HISTORY AND THEORY 23 (1973). See also HERMAN
PAUL, HAYDEN WHITE 74-76 (2011).
102.
WHITE, METAHISTORY, supra note 34, at 32-39.
103.
WHITE, CONTENT, supra note 23, at 42-43.
104.
Inspired in part by the work of Thomas Kuhn, Richard Rorty approached
analytic philosophy in a way very reminiscent of White's approach to historiography. See
RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 322 (1979). Rorty argued that
the analytic philosopher's preference for empiricism, for example, cannot be justified
because it is more empirical than its alternatives. Id That is begging the question. Those
traditions-empiricism, rationalism, scientific method-were merely the inventions of
particular people, and the question of why you would prefer these traditions over, say,
medieval concepts of the universe, or scientology today, are not amenable to justification in

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

134

[VOL. 56:117

between art and science."0 For more than a century, White explained, historians
had understood themselves as practicing between the poles of pure art on the one
side and pure science on the other, where art was understood as subjective and
creative and science thought objective and analytical.106 Traditionally, historians
rejected both positions, claiming their work to be more craft than science, but more
concrete than the imaginary nature of artistic manipulation.10 7 The dichotomy
relied on an assumption that one could actually tell it like it is-a realistic
assumption in the natural sciences but not anywhere else. Or, to put the sensibility
another way, historical practice might not have been a natural science, but it sure
as hell was not art.10
Pointing to mid-twentieth century developments in the philosophy of
science, White suggested that this famous dichotomy between the imaginary and
the objective was problematic, to say the least.109 When a historian begins the
a way more "objective" than the way in which we would debate styles of art. For Rorty, the
choice of one style over another, whether it was a choice of Marx over FDR, Copernicus
over Ptolemy, or Stravinsky over Copeland, was a choice about edification. Id at 360. And
Rorty found empiricism extremely edifying: "[The] point of edifying philosophy is to keep
the conversation going rather than to find objective truth. Such truth, in the view I am
advocating, is the normal result of normal discourse. Edifying philosophy is not only
abnormal but reactive, having sense only as a protest against attempts to close off

conversation by proposals for universal commensuration through the hypostatization of
some privileged set of descriptions. The danger which edifying discourse tries to avert is
that some vocabulary, some way in which people might come to think of themselves, will
deceive them into thinking that from now on all discourse could be, or should be, normal
discourse. The resulting freezing-over of culture would be, in the eyes of edifying
philosophers, the dehumanization of human beings." Id at 377.
105.
See generally Hayden White, The Burden ofHistory, 5 HISTORY AND THEORY
111 (1966) [hereinafter, White, The Burden of History]. WHITE, TROPICS, supra note 30, at

27. For a related discussion in the context of Science and Technology Studies, see Annelise
Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study ofLaw: Taking on the Technicalities, 53 BUFF.
L. REV. 973, 982-89 (2005).
106.
See White, The Burden offHistory, supra note 105.
107.
Id See also PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY
QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988); James Kloppenberg,

Objectivity and Historicism:A Century ofAmerican Historical Writing, 94 AM.

HIST. REV.

1011 (1989).
108.

See id
Id at 46-47 ("It now seems possible to hold that an explanation need not be
assigned unilaterally to the category of the literally truthful on the one hand or the purely
imaginary on the other, but can be judged solely in terms of the richness of the metaphors
which govern its sequence of articulation. Thus envisaged, the governing metaphor of an
historical account could be treated as a heuristic rule which self-consciously eliminates

109.

certain kinds of data from consideration as evidence. The historian operating under such a
conception could thus be viewed as one who, like the modern artist and scientist, seeks to
exploit a certain perspective on the world that does not pretend to exhaust description or
analysis of all the data in the entire phenomenal field but rather offers itself as one way
among many of disclosing certain aspects of the field . . . . The result of this attitude is not
relativism but the recognition that the style chosen by the artist to represent either an inner
or an outer experience carries with it, on the one hand, specific criteria for determining
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process of explaining something about a given past event, even when the object of

representation is intended to be nothing but fact, the historian inevitably prefigures
the facts in an unavoidable act of translation.110 In grasping at the past event, in
other words, the historian has no choice but to express her view of the fact in
language."' This act of "translating" a fact into a historical narrative, White
explained, was precisely the same act of translating imagined ideas into a novel:112
Literary discourse may differ from historical discourse by virtue of
its primary referents, conceived as imaginary rather than real events,
but the two kinds of discourse are more similar than different since
both operate language in such a way that any clear distinction
between their discursive form and their interpretive content remains
impossible.113
That is, the historian and the novelist are both faced with a set of
materials, and in the work of forcing those materials into a narrative, the
historian/novelist will necessarily confront the structure of language. Whether the
language is English or Arabic, the historian/novelist will never encounter in
language a neutral, empty, and transparent vessel for a telling of the facts, or an
expression of the imaginary." Language has its own structures that will have to
be navigated, and the facts of the past are no less vulnerable to these structures
than are the imagined events of literature. 1 5
By pressing on the conventional distinction between history and literature
in this way, White distanced himself from the worry about whether a history is
"getting it right."116 What is more useful to question is the style in which the
when a given representation is internally consistent and, on the other provides a system of
translation which allows the viewer to link the image with the thing represented on a
specific level of objectification . . .. Style thus functions as what Gombrich calls a 'system
of notation,' as a provisional protocol or an etiquette. When we view the work of an artistor, for that matter, of a scientist-we do not ask if he sees what we would see in the same
general field, but whether or not he has introduced into his representation of it anything that
could be considered false information for anyone who is capable of understanding the
system of notation used."). See also BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY
LIFE: TE CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS (1986).
110.
WHITE, CONTENT, supra note 23, at 47.
111.
Id
112.
Id at 43 ("In historical discourse, the narrative serves to transform into a
story a list of historical events that would otherwise be only a chronicle. In order to effect
this transformation, the events, agents, and agencies represented in the chronicle must be
encoded as story elements; that is, they must be characterized as the kinds of events, agents,
agencies, and so on, that can be apprehended as elements of specific story types. On this
level of encodation, the historical discourse directs the reader's attention to a secondary
referent, different in kind from the events that make up the primary referent, namely, the
plot structures of the various story types cultivated in a given culture.").
113.
WHITE, FIGURAL, supra note 33, at 6.
114.
Id
115.
Id
116.
White has suggested that one element in the historian's traditional aspiration
towards objectivity is the moral meaning associated with an indeterminate historical record.
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history is told, for as White has suggested, "the content is in the form."1 17
However, shifting our focus away from the historian's conclusions and toward the
style in which the historian draws her conclusions, one objection needs immediate
attention." In questioning the distinction between history and literature, we would
be mistaken for understanding White as suggesting that just as a novelist might
write a story about anything, anything goes when it comes to telling history.119 The
idea was never that history and literature are identical, since they so clearly are
not.120 History takes as its object events that actually took place in the past, while
literature is under no such obligation. 121
Take the example of the Holocaust.122 Is it a plausible historical account
of the Third Reich to suggest that had the actor Bill Murray never been childhood
friends with Adolf Hitler, the Holocaust would never have taken place? If done
well, it seems possible that this could form the basis of a novel, but it could never
be a plausible historical account; Hitler was dead before Bill Murray was even
born. Similarly, there also seem to be wrong ways of telling history, even when the
facts are "straight."123 The notion of a historical account of the Holocaust in which
its central themes are presented as a comedy is a well-known example of a
narrative mode which just seems mistakenly attached to a set of facts.124
To push this idea further, we can align White with de Man and suggest
that when it comes to telling the history of the Holocaust, there are only ways of
getting it wrong.125 We might get it wrong because we have made factual errors
(i.e., Bill Murray), we might get it wrong because we have provided a narrative of
the facts that fails to correspond with our underlying premises about the value of
human life (i.e., the Holocaust as comedy), and we might get it wrong simply
because we prioritized one central event at the expense of another, more

supra note 23, at 21-22 ("The demand for closure in the historical story
is a demand, I suggest, for moral meaning, a demand that sequences of real events be
assessed as to their significance as elements of a moral drama. Has any historical narrative
ever been written that was not informed not only by moral awareness but specifically by the
moral authority of the narrator? It is difficult to think of any historical work produced
during the nineteenth century, the classic age of historical narrative, that was not given the
force of a moral judgment on the events it related.").
117.
Id at ix.
118.
WHITE, FIGURAL, supra note 33, at 12-22.
119.
WHITE, CONTENT, supra note 23, at 44-45.
120.
Id
121.
Id
122.
See generally PROBING THE LIMITS OF REPRESENTATION: NAZISM AND THE
"FINAL SOLUTION" (Saul Friedlander ed. 1992).
123.
WHITE, FIGURAL, supra note 33, at 28.
124.
Id at 29-30.
125.
Though there may be some interesting insights creeping around in the blind
spots, I do not mean here to make any explicit references to Paul de Man's infamous history
with the Nazis. For discussion, see DAvID LEHMAN, SIGNS OF THE TIMES: DECONSTRUCTION
AND THE FALL OF PAUL DE MAN (1992).
WHITE, CONTENT,
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"marginal" event (i.e., it was all the fault of the Treaty of Versailles).126 Thus, if
there are no right ways to make a historical account and only wrong ways, history
and literature seem far less different than we may have thought. 127 White explained
that in historical practice, "narrativization produces a meaning ... by imposing a
discursive form on the events that its own chronicle comprises by means that are
poetic in nature . . . . This is what Barthes meant when he said: 'Narrative does not
show, does not imitate . . . . [Its] function is not to "represent," it is to constitute a

spectacle."' 128 Further, White argued:
A history is . . . less like a picture intended to resemble the objects
of which it speaks or a model . . . than "a complex linguistic

structure specifically built for the purpose of showing a part of the
past." In this view, historical discourse is not to be likened to a
picture that permits us to see more clearly an object that would
otherwise remain vague and imprecisely apprehended. Nor is it a
representation of an explanatory procedure intended finally to
provide a definitive answer to the problem of "what really
happened" in some given domain of the past. On the contrary ...
historical discourse is less a matching of an image or a model with
some extrinsic reality than a making of a verbal image, a discursive
"thing" that interferes with our perception of its putative referent
even while fixing our attention on and illuminating it. 129
So just what does the historian do? 130 As White explained, she begins
with the "data," the "facts," the unworked material to be explained. Unfortunately,
126.
See generally, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS (1966);
Michel Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in THE FOUCAULT READER 76 (Paul
Rabinow ed., 1984).
127.
47-48.

128.
129.
130.

WHITE, TROPICS,

supra note 30, at 60;

WHITE, CONTENT,

supra note 23, at

WHITE, CONTENT, supra note 23, at 42-43.
WHITE, FIGURAL, supra note 33, at 6.

Here is White's description of a historian on top of her game:
Now, in my view, any historian who simply described a set of facts in,
let us say, metonymic terms and then went on to emplot its process in the

mode of tragedy

and proceeded to explain those

processes

mechanistically, and finally drew explicit ideological implications from
it-as most vulgar Marxists and materialistic determinists do-would
not only not be very interesting but could legitimately be labeled a
doctrinaire thinker who had "bent the facts" to fit a preconceived theory.
The peculiar dialectic of historical discourse-and of other forms of
discursive prose as well, perhaps even the novel-comes from the effort
of the author to mediate between alternative modes of emplotment and
explanation, which means, finally, mediating between alternative modes
of language use or tropological strategies for originally describing a
given field of phenomena and constituting it as a possible object of

representation. It is this sensitivity to alternative linguistic protocols, cast
in the modes of metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony, that
distinguishes the great historians and philosophers of history from their
less interesting counterparts ....
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there is nothing in the facts themselves that directs the historian about what to
make of them.131 Data does not come preloaded with a figurative language that
might assist the historian in crafting his narrative.132 This figurative language,
absolutely necessary to the making of any historical explanation, must come from
someplace other than the facts themselves.133 Historians therefore gain an
"explanatory effect" by "building into their narratives patterns of meaning similar
to those more explicitly provided by the literary art of the cultures to which they
belong."134 "What the historian must bring to his consideration of the record are
general notions of the kinds of stories that might be found there, just as he must
bring consideration to the problem of narrative representation some notion of the
'pre-generic plot structure' by which the story he tells is endowed with formal
coherency."135 So what are these patterns of meaning, these plots and narrative
structures, and where do they come from? Since, for White, there can be no such
thing as historical explanation without a story, what is the structure in which these
stories are told? And importantly, how does this relate to the discussion of
semiotics and rhetoric from above?
Recall Saussure's distinction between langue and parole.13 6 In the context
of a posited language-system, we begin with the object of the linguist's analysis:
those grammatical rules constituting the langue, generally unconscious to the
speaker, or at least, not consciously visible at the moment of speech. As it happens,
speech-acts often come in prefigured forms-what we might refer to as the
structure of rhetoric. This structure involves those tropes and grooves in the
language-system's terrain, "linking" 13 7 langue and parole. Of course, there is no
129.
131.
Id. at 110 ("As thus envisaged, the historical discourse can be broken down
into two levels of meaning. The facts and their formal explanation or interpretation appears
as the manifest or literal 'surface' of the discourse, while the figurative language used to
WHITE, TROPICS, supra note 30, at

characterize the facts points to a deep-structural meaning . . . . This conception of the

historical discourse permits us to consider the specific story as an image of the events about
which the story is told, while the generic story-type serves as a conceptual model to which
events are to be likened in order to permit their encodation as elements of a recognizable
structure.").

132.
Id. at 60.
133.
WHITE, FIGURAL, supra note 33, at 8 ("In the passage from a study of an
archive to the composition of a discourse to its translation into a written form, historians
must employ the same strategies of linguistic figuration used by imaginative writers to
endow their discourses with the kind of latent, secondary, or connotative meanings that will
require that their works be not only received as messages but read as symbolic structures.").
134.
WHITE, TRoPIcs, supra note 30, at 58.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 60.
See supra note 64.
This is the link de Man was warning against taking too seriously. At the sake

of redundancy, let me state again that I fully accept this deconstructionist critique. My
articulation of a "link" between semiotics and rhetoric in this context is intended as an
irrationalist style of presentation; it is not a positivist, rationalist account of something
actually happening as an essence or a deep truth. I am describing an interpretive practice
and an intellectual orientation-one style of such a practice and orientation. No more, no
less.
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reason to believe that as a matter of fact, the langue actually generates particular
tropes and figures. De Man showed how easily, for instance, we can see that is
precisely not what happens. Nevertheless, it is perfectly appropriate to suggest a
protocol or style in which we do marry langue, parole, and rhetorical structure, so
long as we remember that it is a simulacrum we are expounding, and not truth.
Now, let us begin with the langue. Think of this as the core, or floor, of
the language-system. This is the space where the constitutive rules of the system
are found. Next, query just how it is that we come to operate or exercise these rules
in such wildly different ways. We are obliged to follow the same syntactical rules,
but we use those rules to write so many different things. Is the space between
langue and parole totally indeterminate? I do not think that it is. True, at the level
of parole, anything goes so long as the speech conforms to the syntax. But more
often than not, in the passage from the deep structural rules of the language-system
to the surface-level conclusions, the historian defaults into one of several readymade styles for narrativizing the facts. This is just as true for the historian to the
novelist to, as discussed below,138 the judge.
White explained that there were several levels here in the space between
langue and parole, but for present purposes I want to address just three. The first
and deepest orientation is what White referred to as "tropological."139 "This
ground is that of language itself, which, in areas of study such as history, can be
said to operate tropologically in order to prefigure a field of perception in a
particular modality of relationships."140 White may very well be conflating the
tropological ground with Saussure's langue, but for our purposes, we will take it as
an orientation towards the langue, and not as identical with it.
White suggested that this "tropics of discourse" was inhabited by the four
master tropes of metaphor, metonymy, synechdoche, and irony. 14 These tropes are
interpretive strategies mediating between individual consciousness and the
phenomenal world, and it is through these strategies that we endow experience
with meaning.142 The strategy of metaphor, for example, takes our experiences of
138.
See infra notes 150-91.
139.
WHITE, CONTENT, supra note 23, at 47 ("If there is any logic presiding over
the transition from the level of fact or event in the discourse of that narrative, it is the logic
of figuration itself, which is to say, tropology. This transition is effected by a displacement
of the facts onto the ground of literary fictions or, what amounts to the same thing, the
projection onto the facts of the plot structure of one or another of the genres of literary
figuration.").
140.
WHITE, TROPICS, supra note 30, at 72 ("Historiographical disputes will tend
to turn, not only upon the matter of what are the facts, but also upon that of their meaning.
But meaning, in turn, will be construed in terms of the possible modalities of natural
language itself, and specifically in terms of the dominant tropological strategies by which
unknown or unfamiliar phenomena are provided with meanings by different kinds of
metaphorical appropriations.").
141.
Kenneth Burke, Four Master Tropes, 3 KENYON REVIEW 421, 421 (1941);
KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVEs 503 (1969). I discuss irony below, infra notes
361-90.
142.
WHITE, TROPICS, supra note 30, at 72.
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difference and finds in those differences deeper similarities. Metonymic strategies
construct the whole out of the prioritized part, assuming in the process the
distinction between universal and particular. The strategy of synecdoche, in
contrast, relies on the universal/particular distinction but in order to prioritize the
totality.143 As White explains, "the important point is that in metaphor, metonymy,
and synecdoche alike language provides us with models of the direction that
thought itself might take in its effort to provide meaning to areas of experience not
already regarded as being cognitively secured by either common sense, tradition,
or science.""'
Thus, the first plane of tropological orientation concerns the way in which
the analyst approaches the langue in order to secure meaning." This orientation
sets the table for the analysis to follow, though it does not strictly determine the
subsequent cognitive and rhetorical moves. As for the cognitive move, this
involves a prefigurative choice of the historian about the kind of explanation she
will make of the materials. This is a choice about "what a set of historical events
will look like once they have been explained."14 6 Now, I have somewhat oddly
labeled this as a prefigurative choice, combining what seems like an unconscious
emphasis on prefigurative with a conscious choice. But I think this ambiguity is
appropriate here, since it signals just the right tone: In most cases, the historian
may very well have a sense of the explanatory form she is going to pursue, but
have little if any sense about the way in which that form will prefigure the
rhetorical terrain on which the explanation is going to happen.
Beyond what White referred to as this prefigurative, explanatory
orientation lies another plane, moving closer in the direction of parole and away
from the deep rules of the langue: the rhetorical mode. 1 7 As opposed to the
historian's semiconscious explanatory orientation, this next phase is about the sort

143.
White explores these tropological strategies at length in his Metahistory.He
uses Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Croce as textual representatives. WHITE, METAHISTORY,
supra note 34, at xi.
144.
WHITE, TROPICs, supra note 30, at 73.
145.
WHITE, FIGURAL, supra note 33, at 8 ("Indeed, it is only by troping, rather

than by logical deduction, that any given set of the kinds of past event we would wish to call
historical can be (first) represented as having the order of a chronicle; (second) transformed
by emplotment into a story with identifiable beginning, middle, and end phases; and (third)
constituted as the subject of whatever formal arguments may be adduced to establish their
'meaning'-cognitive, ethical, or aesthetic, as the case may be.").
146.
WHITE, TRopics, supra note 30, at 63 ("In other words, we can distinguish
among the various forms of explanation in historiography in two ways: on the basis of the
direction that the analytical operation is presumed to take (towards dispersion or
integration) and on the basis of the paradigm of the general aspect that the explicated set of
phenomena will assume at the end of this operation."). White explained that historical
conceptions of "explanation" gravitated around four common forms: idiographic (Niebuhr,
Michelet), contextualist (Burckhardt), organicist (Hegel), and mechanistic (Marx). Id. at 6467.

147.
The choice of one explanatory mode does not lead into a rhetorical mode; the
operations are distinct. Id. at 66.
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of plot to be used in the explanation.' What form of narrative is to be deployed?
The rhetorical orientation concerns the aesthetic choice to present the materials as
a quest, a tragedy, a satire, or some other plot structure. 149
To recap, at the bottom of the structure are the grammatical rules out of
which the practice of history is constituted. In White's usage, this deep structure is
tropological, but I want to emphasize a distinction between the langue itself and
the tropological orientation the historian uses in her decisions to speak the langue
in one form rather than another. Next comes the historian's explanatory
orientation; the choice about how the particular universe of past facts will be given
an explanatory effect. Last is the form of emplotment, which involves the
historian's more conscious decision to stylize the facts through the use of certain
figures rather than others, such as tragedy, comedy, and romance.
RhetoricalOrientation
(Tragedi; Rom!ance,
Comedy. Satire)

C. Law and Politics

In the discussion above I have made two key assertions. First, I
introduced a structuralist style of analysis in which an agent deploys semiotics in
her analysis of some social domain as a language-system. Thus, just as we
understand English to operate in the structures of grammar and rhetoric, so too can
we see the forms of historical practice as caught up in a drama of linguistic
dynamics. Hayden White represents such a structuralist approach to the study of
history, though his style is demonstrably different from the structuralist works of
Claude Levi-Strauss or Michel Foucault. The second assertion is that in bringing
this structuralist orientation to historical work, an old and conventional distinction
148.
Among the plots are Romance, Comedy, Tragedy, and Satire. Id.
149.
Id. at 67 ("Historians interpret their materials in two ways: by the choice of a
plot structure, which gives to their narratives a recognizable form, and by the choice of a
paradigm of explanation, which gives to their arguments a specific shape, thrust, and mode
of articulations.").
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between history and literature emerged as a problem. Traditionally, history was
understood as a very different thing than literature: The former is meant to
represent and report a record of events, as they really happened. In contrast, the
stories of the literary canon are under no such obligations. White argued that while
real differences do remain between these two domains, they are typically
exaggerated.
Like the novelist or poet, the historian has no choice but to choose among
many forms of explanatory modes in telling her story, has no choice but to choose
among many plot structures in crafting her narrative, and has no choice but to style
that narrative in a field of material that she has already prefigured in tropological
terms. These disciplinary similarities between the work of the historian and the
novelist did not require us to see history as meaningless or fictive; it demanded
that we see in both history and literature the making of a kind of truth that has little
resonance in the parodied distinction between the positivist flavor of the natural
sciences and the totally discretionary flavor of the humanities.
Hayden White's critique of the history and literature distinction has real
traction in the long-standing debate over the relation between law and politics. Just
as White targeted the conventional view of the historian's task as looking into the
archived materials in order to produce a "right answer" about what "really
happened," so too is there an analogue in a conventional view about the task of the
judge. In this view, the role of the judge is to approach the relevant legal materials
in a neutral and, to the extent it is possible, objective manner. 50 In such a posture,
the judge should be able to produce a legal argument indigenous to the judicial
branch-meaning, the product of the judge's research should be something quite
different from a legislative rule or administrative decision.1"' The judge's task is
150.

For a defense of "objectivity" in adjudication, see Jules Coleman & Brian

Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, andAuthority, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 549 (1993). For another

view, see UNGER, infra note 152.
151.
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct 2675, 2698 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (attacking the Majority's "assertion of judicial supremacy over the people's
Representatives in Congress and the Executive. It envisions a Supreme Court standing (or
rather enthroned) at the apex of government, empowered to decide all constitutional
questions, always and everywhere 'primary' in its role. This image of the Court would have
been unrecognizable to those who wrote and ratified our national charter. They knew well
the dangers of 'primary' power, and so created branches of government that would be
'perfectly coordinate by the terms of their common commission,' none of which branches
could 'pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their
respective powers.' The people did this to protect themselves. They did it to guard their
right to self-rule against the black-robed supremacy that today's majority finds so attractive.
So it was that Madison could confidently state, with no fear of contradiction, that there was
nothing of 'greater intrinsic value' or 'stamped with the authority of more enlightened
patrons of liberty' than a government of separate and coordinate powers.") (citations
omitted); Morrison v. Nat'l Australian Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010) (criticizing the
"results of judicial-speculation-made-law-divining what Congress would have wanted if it
had thought of the situation before the court."); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 516
(2008) ("The dissent's contrary approach would assign to the courts-not the political
branches-the primary role in deciding when and how international agreements will be
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more impersonal and general than the more arbitrary and political work of the
legislative and executive branches.152 To hook this back into the history/literature
distinction, we can see that this image of the judge is a reflection of White's image
of the historian. In both cases, the judge and the historian are meant to be doing
something impersonal and neutral. The judge distances herself from the regulator;
the historian distances herself from the novelist.
Predictably, and like the history/literature distinction, the law/politics
distinction has long been an object of critique.153 In fact, we could fairly say that
the critique dates back to the turn of the twentieth century."' The version of the
critique that is most relevant here, however, begins in the 1970s. "' In Interpretive
Construction in the Substantive CriminalLaw, Mark Kelman approached judicial
practice in a way reminiscent of White's approach to historical practice.156 When a
judge begins the process of crafting a legal argument, Kelman suggested, the judge
engages in a two-step process: (1) interpretive construction and (2) rational
rhetoricism.1 7 Kelman's use of "interpretive construction" seemed to combine
White's notions of tropological orientation and explanatory orientation. As
Kelman explained, an interpretive construct referred "both to the way we construe
a factual situation [tropological orientation] and to the way we frame the possible
rules to handle the situation [explanatory orientation].""' Once the judge has
deployed a particular interpretive construct, the way is cleared for legal rhetoric,
"the stuff of admirable legal analysis."15 9 This involves:

enforced. To read a treaty so that it sometimes has the effect of domestic law and sometimes
does not is tantamount to vesting with the judiciary the power not only to interpret but also
to create the law.").
152.
For an extended discussion, see ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS
(1975).
153.
For two different versions of the story, see John Henry Schlegel, Does
Duncan Kennedy Wear Boxers or Briefs? Does Richard PosnerEver Sleep? Writing About
Jurisprudence,High Culture and the History of Intellectuals, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 277 (1997);
John Henry Schlegel, Of Duncan, Peter and Thomas Kuhn, 22 CARDOzO L. REV. 1061
(2001); David Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and
Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1 (1972); David Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal
Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1984).
154.
We can go at least as far back as Holmes. For discussion, see Justin
Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics: Mapping Pragmatism in Contemporary Legal
Analysis, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 565. To get even further, see Duncan Kennedy, Three
Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought 1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006)
[hereinafter Kennedy, Globalization].
155.
For discussion, see Justin Desautels-Stein, The Tragedy of Legal
Structuralism, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript on file with
author).
156.
33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 591 (1981).
157.
Id. at 591-92.
158.
Id. at 592
Id.
159.
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distinguishing and analyzing cases, applying familiar policies to
unobvious fact patterns, and emphasizing the degree to which we
can rely on the least controversial underlying values. These
rhetorical techniques are so intellectually complex that there is a
powerful tendency to elevate falsely the importance of intellect in
actual legal decisionmaking, to fail to see the interpretive
construction that makes the wise posturing possible. 160
This actual "stuff' of legal argument-what we recognize as the work product of
lawyers and judges alike-could only proceed after an interpretive construct was
fully in place. 16 1 To think otherwise is to fall prey to the same mistake of the
conventional historian: believing that something in the given materials came
preloaded with a way of explaining those materials.
In the domain of substantive criminal law, Kelman argued that judges
unconsciously used (or were used by) four basic interpretive constructs. 162 One of
these interpretive constructs cabins the way in which the judge is meant to view
the relevant timeframe for a dispute. 163 Ought a judge focus solely on the isolated
incident that is the predicate for the dispute, or should she move further back in
time, addressing the personal histories of the parties? 164 The decision to frame a
dispute in the short versus the long term has obvious consequences: Depending on
which construct the judge happens to deploy, a defendant's intentional choices
might look more like coerced ones, or vice versa. 165 A second and related construct
involves the question of whether the judge will consider the material fact as a
unified story unfolding through a series of events, or as a disaggregated series of
events, some material and others less so. 16 6 A third kind of interpretive construct
involves the judge's understanding of intent, 167 and a fourth includes the idea of
the defendant. 168 In both cases of intent and defendant, there appears to be a binary
split enabling the judge to move in opposite directions-directions with palpable
consequences for the legal arguments to follow. 169 In the process of practicing law,
Kelman suggested, judges are unconsciously guided by one or more of these
constructs toward more conscious explanatory techniques. 170 Two in particular
involve choices in the domains of (1) intentionalism and determinism, and (2)
rules and standards. Like White, Kelman did not believe that the use of any one
interpretive construct would necessarily lead to a preference for determinism and

Id.
160.
161.
Id. at 593.
162.
Id. I have never asked Kelman, but as far as I know it is just a coincidence
that Kelman and White both identified four master constructs for interpreting legal and
historical material.
163.
Id. at 593-94.
164.
See id.
165.
Id. at 594.
166.
Id. at 594-95.
167.
Id. at 595-96.
168.
Id. at 596.
169.
Id. at 595-96.
170.
Id. at 596-600.
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rules, or some other combination.' But, also like White, Kelman suggested that
there might be "elective affinities"172 between different levels of the interpretive
practice.173
Of course, Kelman was not the first to suggest that ideology (or
something like it) plays a role in the crafting of legal arguments."' H.L.A. Hart,
for example, explained that when faced with "hard cases," judges often find
themselves in the penumbra and are forced to fill gaps in the law with policy
analysis.'
But Kelman was not talking about Hart's "core and penumbra."
Rather, Kelman's was the more controversial point that in every instance of legal
argument, the judge's decision was structured through the use of preconceptual
and rhetorical devices.176 What is clear for Kelman and White is that there is
nothing rational or logical about the historian/judge's use of one interpretive
orientation over another. At the metalevel at which their analyses are operating,
there are no scientific criteria for distinguishing the use of one orientation over
another.
In his Missing Pieces, Pierre Schlag similarly argued for a set of four
forms of unconscious orientation mediating the judge's experience of the legal
material."' These forms were deep and out of sight, providing the judge with ways
of thinking, ways of framing and organizing the legal world."' Schlag described
the four orientations:
[1] Prerationalism asks no questions and takes things as given. It is
extremely secure in its understanding of the world; it does not allow
the internal intellectual distance that would permit self-reflection.
[2] Rationalism is cognitively upsetting, because it constantly calls
the world into question and asks for the redemption and justification
of descriptive and normative claims. [3] Modernism pushes the
critical edge even further and puts reason on trial. Modernism
constantly strives to articulate in polite, theoretical terms the

171.
Id. at 600.
172.
WHITE, METAHISTORY, supra note 34, at 29 ("In my view, a historiographical
style represents a particular combination of modes of emplotment, argument, and
ideological implication. But the various modes of emplotment, argument, and ideological
implication cannot be indiscriminately combined in a given work .... There are, as it were,
elective affinities among the various modes that might be used to gain an explanatory effect
of the different levels of composition. And these elective affinities are based on structural
homologies which can be discerned among the possible modes of emplotment, argument,
and ideological implication."). For a recent discussion of the idea of "elective affinities,"
see Christopher Tomlins, How Autonomous Is Law ?, 3 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Sci. 45 (2007).
173.
Kelman, supra note 156, at 600 ("Generally speaking, narrow time frames
buttress the traditionally asserted intentionalism of the criminal justice system.").
174.
Legal realism often gets the credit for this point. See, e.g., William Singer,
Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 465 (1988).
175.
See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1960).
176.
Kelman, supra note 156, at 663.
177.
67 TEx. L. REV. 1195, 1195 (1989).
178.
Id. at 1208-09
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unpresentable underside of reason. [4] Postmodernism continues the
modernist project, but drops the polite, theoretical conversation."
Schlag described the "prerationalist" orientation as operating in the mind
of the originalist: The legal explanation pivots around some historical given. It will
not matter much how "rational" or ethically desirable the point may be; if this is
how it was situated in its "original position," a proper mode of explanation will
follow. 80 "Prerationalism in law takes the form of an abiding and unquestioning
observance of intuition, craft, convention, tradition, or other sacred texts.""1 The
rationalist orientation is very different. For a judge operating in this mode of
consciousness, legal explanations are brutally dominated by rigorous and reasoned
argument. "Rationalist consciousness insists first and foremost on the justification
of claims according to established rules of logic or, more broadly, good reasoning.
Claims are redeemable for rationalist consciousness if one can demonstrate that
they follow correctly from accepted premises."182
In contrast is what Schlag named a "modernist" form of consciousness.183
For the modernist judge, the archive of material looks much more like the way in
which White and Kelman have described it. On this account, there simply is no
rational way of organizing, explaining, or arguing, 8' and these modes of
rationalist argument are questioned for the ideological content their scientific form
is in the service of hiding.185
For modernists, theory, reason, and discourse are not only
autonomous forms of thought but also activities or practices whose
status is underwritten by some nonrational underside: contradictions
among the means and relations of production (Marx), the advent of
bureaucratic organization (Weber), the unconscious (Freud), will to
power (Nietzsche), cultural practice (Wittgenstein). For modernists,
reason itself must be scrutinized before its products can be admitted
into the intellectual arena . . . [A modernist orientation] demands

that the individual ego renounce its claims to the status of
the fundamental epistemological, ontological, or methodological
unit. This demand does not just require the development of new
categories. It is not, for example, merely a matter of substituting will
to power or class interest for Aristotelian logic. What is required is
nothing less than a change in the very form in which categories are
used to think a change not just in what is thought, but in the way it
is thought.186

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 1208.
See id. at 1209.
Id.
Id. at 1211.
Id. at 1214.
Id. at 1215.
Id.
Id. at 1213.
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Finally, Schlag presents poststructuralism as a fourth type of intellectual
orientation.1 7 While it is common enough to offer examples of deconstruction in
legal analysis, Schlag does not present any instances that might be recognizable in
the context of judicial practice."' This is not to criticize Schlag; I would not be
sure how to construct such an image, either. What would a judicial practice look
like exactly, if it "abandon[ed] the search for common ground altogether,
following instead the ironic twists and turns of difference, discontinuity, and
disjuncture"?189
Schlag's presentation of the four orientations is in itself
poststructuralist, 190 while Kelman and White are operating more in the structuralist
mode. 191 But on what they all agree is the importance of bringing attention to the
largely unconscious orientations historians and judges bring to the archived
material when tasked with the creation of an argument. For the historian, the
upshot of highlighting the prefigural troping of the story is to collapse the
distinction between impersonal "history" and an imaginary literature. For the
judge, the point is to highlight the preconceptual orientations that help the judge
make sense of the legal materials before the legal argument has even been
constructed. This problematizes the distinction between impersonal adjudication
and political thought. There simply is not an impersonal or neutral or objective
way of approaching the relevant materials, since those materials do not come
ready-made with instructions for organizing them.
Before turning to the application of this view to the field of international
law, I want to emphasize two issues that we might find troubling. First, if we take
this discussion seriously, does this mean that once we have identified the relevant
interpretive orientations of the judge or historian, we can predict what sort of story
she will tell? Absolutely not. Remember, an acquaintance with the background
orientations tells us nothing about content, i.e., what will actually be said. What
such a familiarity does, however, is tell us something about the repeated forms in
which the stories will be told. And as White, Kelman, and Schlag all claim: The
content is in the form.

187
Id. at 1217.
188.
See id. at 1248. This is perhaps the closest he gets: "The postmodernist
would certainly not hesitate to point out the incoherence of both the formalist and the realist
position. The formalist position suffers in that it is always the judge who writes the law. If
the judge cannot be trusted to apply her own judgment, it follows that she cannot be trusted
to encode her judgment into formalist doctrine. If language cannot be trusted, neither can
the judicial self: that self is in the prison house of language along with everyone else. Thus,
for the postmodernist, there can be no central conceptual economy among sectors-in part
because the sectors cannot be stabilized. The sectorization of the legal field consumes the
very attempt to rationalize and stabilize the discourse. The various sectors are not related in
simple linear fashion, but rather through a multiplicity of different relations, including
contradiction, antagonism, reinforcement, and repetition." Id. at 1235.
189.
Id. at 1241.
190.
See id. at 1247.
191.
Kelman, supra note 156, at 670-71.
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Second, is it appropriate to conclude that law and politics are
indistinguishable? It cannot be stated too emphatically: no. History and literature
are different, just as law and politics are different. The stakes are different, the
referents are different, the grammars are different, the rhetorics are different. But
the differences between law and politics are closer to the differences between
English and Arabic, rather than differences between fire and water.
D. InternationalLaw

Having established the basis of structuralism in semiotics, and the similar
way in which structuralist interpretation complicates storied distinctions such as
history/literature and law/politics, the discussion here pushes into a specific field
of law, that of international law. To do so is not entirely new. Particularly in the
1970s and 1980s, structuralism was applied to a number of specific legal
domains, 192 including international law. 193
In the context of international law, a structuralist approach illuminates
three chronic problems. The first problem concerns the tendency to regard
international law as indistinguishable from politics or morality. 194 To suggest that
international law is not really law at all is to make what we can call the "it's all
politics" mistake. This happens, for example, when scholars recount the many
instances of interstate violence that have occurred since World War II and
conclude that the prohibition on the use of force in the U.N. Charter is in
"desuetude." 195 Or, putting a different spin on the point, others suggest that the
current use of drones is legal to the extent that it is in the interests of the great
powers for it to be legal. 196 Of course, many might respond that this makes a

192.

See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL
(2006); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997).
193.
See MARTTI KOSKENIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989); David Kennedy, Theses About International
Law Discourse, in GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1980).
194.
For one recent example, see Oona Hathaway & Scott Shapiro, Outcasting:
Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252 (2011). This is
probably the most familiar of all problems for international law, and for reasons that are
offered with mind-numbing regularity. We are beginning to close in on two hundred years
since the English philosopher John Austin first published his theory of law, and a hundred
and fifty since international lawyers started freaking out about it. So the story goes, Austin
expounded a view of law whereby "law" would come into being once a superior issued an
enforceable command to an inferior. In the later decades of the nineteenth century,
international lawyers started taking notice of the definition, and worried that because
sovereign states have no superiors, international law was a facade.
The debate has gone back and forth ever since, with "realists" claiming international
law to not be real law for one reason or another, and international lawyers defending law's
validity for reasons somehow invisible to the realists.
195.
See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, THE FOG OF LAW: PRAGMATISM, SECURITY, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010).
196.
See generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006).
THOUGHT
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mockery of international law as law, and that what these lawyers are describing is
not law at all, but crude political muscle.197
Rather than viewing international law as nothing but political cover, a
second problem emerges in reverse. In this position, scholars believe in the
availability of objectively correct legal solutions. Law is formally and functionally
autonomous from politics.198 International law is capable of generating correct
resolutions to concrete problems, and reasonable people of varying persuasions
can agree on what counts as a correct resolution and what is not. Thus, we could
take the example of the well-known drone strike that killed Anwar al-Awlaki, and
claim in good conscience that the fact of its legality preceded the adjudication.199
We might say, pursuing this example further, that the armed conflict with al
Qaeda, if it exists anywhere, does not extend to Yemen, and as a consequence the
relevant legal framework for adjudicating the drone strike was human rights law.
Under human rights law, as this view would have it, the particular attack on alAwlaki, riding along through the Yemeni desert, was flatly illegal. This second
problem therefore involves the unproblematic view of a strictly autonomous law,
sealed off from political or ideological influence.
As we have seen already, these two problems have to do with our
interpretive practice. They are problems about how the judge finds the relevant
facts, frames those facts, and pushes them into the work of legal reasoning. A third
problem, however, involves a more specific issue of interpretation in the special
context of international law. It is a commonplace in the international law
community to situate debates between those in favor of sovereignty and those in
favor of some other more progressive position like peace or human rights. In these
debates, the sovereign position is suggested to have some sort of determinate
meaning, just as the peace position is expected to have one as well. So we see
"sovereignty versus human rights," or "sovereignty versus peace," or sovereignty
versus some other nonsovereign norm. It is a real mistake, however, to think that
an argument in favor of sovereignty necessarily means anything about peace or
rights, just as it is a mistake to think that it could lead to a position on the legality
of drone strikes. It is a mistake because an argument in favor of sovereignty does
not necessarily lead to anything at all. I come back to this in my description of the
"statist" orientation below.
To summarize, the three problems are these. First, there is the
"pragmatist" judge targeted by Dworkin in Law 's Empire.2 00 The judge convinced
of this perspective does not believe that international law is really law at all, and

197.
Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in
InternationalLaw, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1404 (2006).
198.
For a recent and interesting take, see JEAN D'ASPREMONT, FORMALISM AND
THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011).
199.
Among the most systematic illustrations of this is Robert Chesney, Who May
Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the InternationalRegulation of Lethal
Force, 13 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN LAW 3 (2010).
200.
DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 151-75.
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that it is all just politics. Second, there is Dworkin's "positivist,"201 faithfully
believing in the text of international rules as formally logical and coherent, and
fully capable of resolving concrete disputes. The meaning is waiting in the text,
and the politics of a given interpretive practice is, or should be, irrelevant. Third,
there is the view that when positivists and pragmatists actually go about
adjudicating an international law claim, they will tend to choose from relatively
determinate positions about sovereignty, human rights, and so on. In this view, the
human rights advocate will pray for the judges to avoid the sovereignty position,
since they know that it will not bode well for their defense.
From a structuralist perspective, these three problems are not really
problems so much as they are mistakes. Each view of the way judges go about
interpreting the legal material in an international law case is wrong. With respect
to the first problem of whether international law is really law, consider for a
moment the seemingly random question, "Is Amharic a language?" Amharic is the
official language of Ethiopia, but it is little known in many parts of the world,
including the United States, Europe, and Asia. Its effects are arguably of little
consequence for those people that have never heard of it, as well as for those that
know of it but have never heard it spoken or know how to speak it. But is any of
this relevant to the question of whether Amharic is a language? Your gut reaction
is likely that these considerations are irrelevant, and that if we want to know the
answer, we need to know something about the conventional methods we use for
defining a language, and then look to see if Amharic meets that definition.
Amharic, Arabic, Chinese, and English may be called "languages" because they
share the basic constitutive elements of language.202
Similarly, in addressing the "it's all politics" problem and the suspicion
that international law is really only international politics, the legal structuralist asks
instead, "is international law a language-system?" She could ask the same of
contract law, antitrust law, or constitutional law. The structuralist looks for a basic
syntax, a working lexicon, explanatory modes, narrative models, and recurring
tropes.203 If we find these elements in the discourse of international law-the
manner in which the very large global community of international law scholars,
judges, and practitioners speak write international law-then yes, international law
is a language-system. There is a discourse of international law, just as there is a
discourse of constitutional law, and so on. On this view, it is a mistake to belabor
the question of whether international law is really law, whatever that might mean.
The better and more relevant question is whether international law is a functioning
language-system, and the best answer is that it is.
There is a separate question lurking here about the social imapct of a
particular language-system, just as we might ask of the impact of Amharic. If the
effects of international law or contract law or some other field of law are deemed
201.
Id. at 114-50.
202.
Of course, the basis of language will itself be contested. For one recent
treatment, see JOHN SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD: THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN
CIVILIZATION (2009).
203.
See infra notes 100-49.
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negligible, then we have entered a conversation about the social meaning of that
language-system, but not one about whether the field is constituted as a languagesystem in the first place.204 When commentators suggest that international law is
not really law, they are implicitly conflating these two conversations, suggesting
that in order to "really be law," a legal system must satisfy some set of social
purposes, having some particular social effect. They are looking for international
law's efficacy in a sociological evaluation of a given place and time.205
"International law was not followed here; it had no impact there." To be sure, these
issues are essential, and I do not want to be understood as suggesting that we
should ignore questions about law's social role. Indeed, it is critical that we bring
attention to those places where international rules are not followed, or appear out
of sync with the interests and needs of people and power, or advantage the wealthy
at the expense of the subordinated. But for every account of international law's
lack of effectiveness, there are contrary accounts of its power. It is a very messy
business making claims about whether a legal system is or is not having a
particular social effect or realizing some special purpose. It is also a different
business than establishing the semiotic basis of a legal structure.
The bottom line is that the apparently unstoppable desire to ask whether
international law is really law consistently fails to see that the distinction between
"the law in action" and "law in the books" is a distinction made possible by the
language of international law. A popular rhetorical move is to criticize
international law's effectiveness, just as it is a popular countermove to defend
international law's effectiveness. Bracketing questions about international law's
capacity to meet certain social needs, the structuralist interrogates the interpretive
orientations and the constitutive grammar that motivate these recurring rhetorical
forms. The question for the structuralist is not about the correspondence between
the legal system and the real world (as if they were different things), but it is about
the way in which the grammar of the legal system sets the rules for the forms in
which we go about talking about things like correspondence. On the structuralist
view, international law is just as much law as any other legal field similarly
constituted as a language-system, just as Amharic is as much a language as any
other.
Thus, for the legal
just a mistake. The point is
that it is only politics. The
getting at the meaning and
204.

structuralist, the "it's all politics" problem is actually
neither that international law is in fact really law, nor
point is that this is simply an unhelpful way of even
merit of international law. Further, by stressing the

While Raz does not draw this distinction himself, his well-known essay on

the rule of law establishes the common view that in order for law to be valid we need to
know something of its social effects. "Regarding the rule of law as the inherent or specific
virtue of law is a result of the instrumental conception of law. The law is not just a fact of
life. It is a form of social organization which should be used properly and for the proper
ends. It is a tool in the hands of men differing from many others in being versatile and
capable of being used for a large variety of proper purposes .

. .

. The law to be law must be

capable of guiding behavior, however inefficiently." Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its
Virtue, 93 L. Q. REv. 195, 208 (1977).
205.
See generallyERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM (2009).
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langue generating the forms of intenational legal argument, the structuralist
speaks to the very thing worrying the "law is just politics" people: When viewed as
a language-system, it becomes clear that judges are actually quite deeply
constrained by the legal structure in which they are operating. The fears that
international law is susceptible to an "anything goes" mentality vanish when we
consider the powerfully constraining nature of the legal structure.
Now, in addressing the second problem of formally autonomous law, the
structuralist does an about-face, shifting from an emphasis on langue to parole. In
this case, the judge believes that the text holds all the power, and that international
law is really law like any other field, in a strong ontological sense. For the
structuralist, in contrast, it is conceded that the granunar governs much in terms of
the style in which the judge fashions her rhetoric, but it must also be emphasized
that the substance of what is said is highly discretionary. Again, so long as the
granunar is obeyed, the legal speaker can say just about whatever he wants. The
answer to a question about the legality of drone strikes most certainly does not lie
in the text. In the end, the answer lies in the judge's own discretion (though, as the
structuralist has already counseled, this discretion is nevertheless highly
disciplined by the structural constraints of the granunar and the rhetoric).
As for the third mistake, the structuralist stresses how these highly
constraining and highly discretionary aspects of the language of international law
unite in the subsystem of sovereignty. As will be discussed below, sovereignty
operates at a number of levels in the discourse of international law. At a deep
tropological level, the language of sovereignty provides the speaker with an
orientation toward the legal materials. This judge will move toward the question,
whatever it might be, with a general expectation that the sovereign will be an
important part of the story. The story may ultimately be explained as an argument
about the right of the sovereign to independence and integrity, or the right of a
sovereign to self-defense. There is a cascade of rhetorical moves that will rain
down before the judge moving from such an orientation, but what will not confront
the judge is a ready-made view of sovereignty in relation to the question at hand.
Sovereignty may equip the judge with orientations, grammars, and rhetorical
patterns, but it will definitely not tell him whether a drone strike was legal under
international law. Nor would peace or human rights or communitarianism. In each
case, the judge is oriented toward the language in a particular way, and as a result,
is highly constrained by that orientation. But the orientation only constrains the
form of the argument. Semiotics never asks what a legal rule means; it asks how
the rule means.

II. THE LAW OF KILLING
In this Part, I build off of the discussion of international law in the last
Section and apply the structuralist perspective to the example of the new drone
wars, and, more particularly, the emerging law of killing.
But first, a little background. Under the watch of the Obama
Administration, the United States has transformed the much-maligned "War on
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Terror" into an eerie campaign of machine versus man.206 In contrast to
increasingly outdated deployments of piloted aircraft and ground troops, the
United States now utilizes a fleet of weaponized robots in the hunt for suspected
terrorists.20 Colloquially known as drones, these unmanned aerial vehicles range
from the Reaper-the largest, fastest, and most heavily armed of the U.S. drone
fleet-to microdrones the size of insects.208 The impact on the "War on Terror"
has been staggering.209
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the U.S. government's use of
unmanned aerial aircraft in its global campaign against suspected terrorists was
little known and relatively infrequent.210 During the Bush years, there were close
to fifty drone strikes accounting for about 400 dead.211 After President Obama took
office, things changed.212 In the first two years of President Obama's
administration, the U.S. initiated four times as many drone attacks as it had during
206.
See, e.g., Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret Kill List Proves a Test of Obama's
Principles and Will, N.Y. TiEs, May 29, 2012, at Al; Daniel Klaidman, Drones: The
Silent Killers, NEWSWEEK (May 28, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.connewsweek/2012/
05/27/drones-the-silent-killers.html; Noura S. Erakat, New Imminence in the Time of
Obama: The Impact of TargetedKillings on the Law of Self-Defense, 56 ARIz. L. REV. 195,
197 (2014) (discussing how, every Tuesday, President Obama and his advisers review slides
of terrorism suspects and determine who poses an imminent threat and should be targeted
for killing).
207.
Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis, NEW Am. FOUND., http://counterterrorism.
newamerica.net/drones (last visited Jan. 23, 2014).
208.
Elizabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, War Evolves with Drones, Some Tiny
as Bugs, N.Y. TEIES, June 19, 2011, at Al; Pentagon Helps Build Meshworm
Reconnaissance Robot, BBC NEWS (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.bbc.connews/technology19200285.
209.
On the terrifying and human aspects of drone warfare, see Pir Zubair Shah,
My Drone War, FOREIGN POL'Y (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.con
articles/2012/02/27/mydrone war. See also Peter L. Bergen, Warriorin Chief N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 2012, at SRI; Daniel Byman, Al Qaeda's Terrible Spring, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May
24, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67864/daniel-byman/al-qaedas-terriblespring; Jonathan Master, Targeted Killings, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Apr. 30,
2012), http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627.
210.
See Greg Miller, Under Obama, an Emerging Global Apparatusfor Drone
Killing, WASH. POST (Dec. 27, 2011), http://www.washington post.com/national/
national-security/under-obama-an-emergine-global-apparatus-for-dronekilling/2011/12/13/glQANPdLP_story.html.
Id.
211.
212.
David Rohde, The Obama Doctrine, FOREIGN POL'Y (Mar. 13, 2012),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/the obama doctrine ("[T]echnology has
enabled Obama to become something few expected: a president who has dramatically
expanded the executive branch's ability to wage high-tech clandestine war. With a
determination that has surprised many, Obama has embraced the CIA, expanded its powers,
and approved more targeted killings than any modern president. Over the last three years,
the Obama administration has carried out at least 239 covert drone strikes, more than five
times the 44 approved under George W. Bush."). For the numbers, see Drone Wars
Pakistan:Analysis, NEW Ai. FOUND., http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones (last
visited Jan. 23, 2014).
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the entire eight years of the Bush Administration.213 As the Washington Post has
reported, the Obama Administration's "global apparatus for drone killing"214 had
grown to include dozens of secret facilities in the U.S., North Africa, and the
Arabian peninsula.215 Further, while "[o]ther commanders in chief have presided
over wars with far higher casualty counts . . . no president has ever relied so

extensively on the secret killing of individuals to advance the nation's security

goals."2 16
The shift in President Obama's approach has not been merely
quantitative. Proponents of the drone wars claim the impact on al Qaeda's
leadership is "undeniable."2 17 Scientific American reports that no other single
advance in military technology has had the kind of effect as the drone program,218
and there is a great sense that the drones have pushed the odds in favor of the U.S.
in its fight against al Qaeda.219 In his moving report on the drone war, Pir Zubair
Shah recounts two Taliban fighters bemoaning the fact that the drones "had
changed everything for al-Qaeda and its local allies."220 As Moises Naim has
stated, drones present an "innovation that has drastically altered the course of
war." 221
Hovering over all of this is the controversial question of whether the
drone wars are legal, a question about which the President seems deeply
interested. 222 Specifically, the question turns on whether it is lawful for the United
213.
Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Washington 's Phantom War: The
Effects of the US Drone Program in Pakistan,FOREIGN AFFAIRS (July/Aug. 2011), available
at http://www.foreignaffairs.conarticles/67939/peter-bergen-and-katherine-tiedemann/
washingtons-phantom-war.
214.
Miller, supra note 210.
215.
Craig Whitlock & Greg Miller, U.S. Assembling Secret Drone Bases in
Africa, Arabian Peninsula, Officials Say, WASH. PosT (Sept. 20, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-building-secret-drone-bases-inafrica-arabian-peninsula-officials-say/2011/09/20/gJQAJ8rOjK story.htmil. On February 5,
2013, it became public that the United States had established a drone base in Saudi Arabia.
Robert F. Worth, Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Drone Strikes' Risks to Get Rare Moment
in the Public Eye, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2013, at Al.
216.
Whitlock & Miller, supra note 215.
Id.
217.
218.
Larry Greenemeier, The Drone Wars: 9/11-Inspired Combat Leans Heavily
on Robot Aircraft, Sci. AM. (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.scientificamerican.com/
article.cfm?id=post-9 11-military-tech-drones.
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See, e.g., P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND
CONFLICT IN THE 21sT CENTURY (2009); Daniel Byman, Terrorism After the Revolutions:
How Secular Uprisings Could Help (or Hurt)Jihadists,90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 48, 53 (2011).
220.
Shah, supranote 209.
221.
Moisds Naim, Drones and IEDs: A Lethal Cocktail, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR INT'L PEACE (Mar. 8, 2012), http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/08/drones-andieds-lethal-cocktail/al gt.
222.
On February 4, 2013, NBC News released a Justice Department White Paper
titled, "Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior
Operational Leader of Al-Qa'ida or an Associated Force" (White Paper). Michael Isikoff,
Justice DepartmentMemo Reveals Legal Case for Drone Strikes on Americans, NBC NEWS
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States to send drones into the territory of foreign sovereigns with the intent of
killing targeted individuals, including U.S. citizens.223 A Special Rapporteur to the
United Nations recently defined the law of killing as involving "the intentional,
premeditated, and deliberate use of lethal force, by states or their agents acting
under color of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a
specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator."224
Somewhat surprisingly, as recently seen in the leak of a Department of Justice
White Paper225 and in a major speech on counterterrorism from the President,226
the Obama Administration has attempted to justify its drone campaign under
international law in a way that the Bush Administration had never done for the
War on Terror.227 For President Obama, and unlike for President Bush,228 there
(Feb. 4, 2013), http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/04/16843014-exclusivejustice-department-memo-reveals-legal-case-for-drone-strikes-on-americans?lite. The White
Paper suggests that the United States is legally justified to kill in such a scenario under what
I call in this Article, the "Charter Wartime" framework. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR
OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA'IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 2 (2013) [hereinafter
WHITE PAPER].

223.

This literature is growing fast. For very recent treatments, see, e.g.,
supra note 24; Monica Hakimi, A FunctionalApproach to Targeting
and Detention, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1365 (2012); Utah Law Review Symposium, The Legal
and Ethical Limits of Technological Warfare (Feb. 1, 2013), http://today.law.utah.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2012/12/Symposium-Agenda.pdf.
224.
Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial,
Summary
or
Arbitrary
Executions, Study on Targeted Killings,
1, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston).
225.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 222.
226.
Barack Obama, The Future of Our FightAgainstTerrorism, (May 23, 2013),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/05/text-of-the-presidents-speech-this-afternoon/.
227.
Eight years after al Qaeda killed 3,000 Americans on September 11, 2001,
the War on Terror came to an end. See, e.g., Dana Priest, Bush's 'War' on Terror Comes to
a Sudden End, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/01/22/AR2009012203929.htil. Of course, al Qaeda did not end,
nor did the U.S. effort to kill and capture suspected terrorists. What did change, however,
was a significant rhetorical shift whereby the War on Terror slogan was exchanged for "the
armed conflict with al Qaeda and associated forces." See Mark V. Vlasic, Assassination &
Targeted Killing-A Historicaland Post-Bin Laden Legal Analysis, 43 GEO. J.INT'L L. 259,
316 (2012); Eric Holder, Attorney General, Address at Northwestern University School of
Law with Remarks Regarding Targeted Killing (Mar. 5, 2012); Jeh Charles Johnson,
General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Address at Yale Law School: National
Security, Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration (Feb. 22, 2012).
While the shift seems trivial, the Obama Administration's preference for "armed conflict"
with nonstate actors invites reasoned legal analysis in a way that was unavailable in the
Bush Administration. The International Committee of the Red Cross explains that "[n]oninternational armed conflicts are protracted armed confrontations occurring between
governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such
TARGETED KILLINGS,

groups . . . . The armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity and the

parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of organisation." International
Comnmittee of the Red Cross, How Is the Term "Armed Conflict' Defined in International
Humanitarian Law? 5 (Mar. 17, 2008), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/
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appears to be a genuine interest in making U.S. counterterrorism policy legally
229
justifiable, and not merely palatable on the grounds of raison d'etat.
In order to illustrate a structuralist approach to this issue of whether drone
strikes are legal, the discussion here in Part II relies upon a sharp distinction
between four intellectual orientations and two explanatory frameworks. Drawing
on the review of their work from above, the analysis below begins in Section A by
pressing Mark Kelman and Pierre Schlag's writing on interpretive constructs and
"intellectual orientations" onto the field of combat. I suggest that there are four
dominant orientations toward the legality of drone strikes: (1) realism;230
(2) individualism; 23 1 (3) communitarianism;2 32 and (4) statism. 233 As I have
described above, by "orientation" I mean that these interpretive positions are
documents/article/other/armed-conflict-article-170308.htm. For critiques of the way in
which the War on Terror rhetoric displaced the role of law, see Philip Alston et al., The
Competence of the UN Human Rights Council and Its Special Procedures in Relation to
Armed Conflicts: ExtrajudicialExecutions in the "War on Terror', 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 183
(2008); Heinz Klug, The Rule ofLaw, War, or Terror, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 365; Mary Ellen
O'Connell, When Is a War Not a War? The Myth of the Global War on Terror, 12 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 535 (2006).

228.
Jack Goldsmith, for example, recently stated in a New York Times editorial
that "[d]rone strikes against terrorists outside of so-called hot battlefields like Afghanistan
have become commonplace during the Obama presidency, and have reportedly decimated
the leadership of Al Qaeda and its affiliates . . . . This fateful new step in our ever-

expanding war against terrorists-intentionally killing an American citizen-is fraught with
the danger of executive overreach or mistakes. But the Obama administration has done an
admirable job to date of balancing these potential dangers against security imperatives."
Jack L. Goldsmith, A Just Act of War, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/opinion/a-just-act-of-war.html? r-3&ref=opinion; see
also Jack L. Goldsmith, Fire When Ready, FOREIGN POL'Y (Mar. 19, 2012),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/19/fire when ready. As Kenneth Anderson
has said, "[t]he Predator drone strategy is a rare example of something that has gone really,
really well for the Obama administration." Kenneth Anderson, Predatorsover Pakistan, 15
WKLY. STANDARD 26, 26 (2010).
229.
President Obama's transparency may, of course, be criticized for not being
nearly transparent enough. See INTERNATIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION CLINIC (STANFORD LAW SCHOOL) & GLOBAL JUSTICE CLINIC (NYU SCHOOL OF
LAW), LIVING UNDER DRONES: DEATH, INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS FROM US DRONE
PRACTICES INPAKISTAN 123-24 (2012).

230.

For an influential account of realism in international relations theory, see

KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979).
231.
My use of "individualism" is meant to indicate a preoccupation with the
individual human being as the primary unit of social analysis. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik,
Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of InternationalPolitics, 4 INT'L ORG.

513 (1997).
232.
Though I think communitarian works like Michael Sandel's Democracy's
Discontent are relevant here, I more specifically have in mind the approach of scholars like
James Brown Scott and Oscar Schachter. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1998); Oscar Schachter, The
Legality ofPro-DemocraticInvasion, 78 AM. J.INT'L L. 645 (1984).
233.
See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 196.
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tropological, largely unconscious, and prefigurative. 4 Armed with an intellectual
orientation of this sort, the judge tasked with determining the legality of a drone
strike will answer the question through the use of an interpretive construct giving
him signals about how to organize the field of materials, how to distinguish
important from peripheral questions about the scope of the facts, and how to
conceive of the relevant legal frameworks from the not-so-relevant ones. Our
judge is in precisely the position of White's historian.
The orientations prefigure the field of legal materials in such a way that a
judge will be more or less inclined to veer toward a certain kind of explanatory
narrative. As discussed below in Section B, in the context of the law of killing
there are usually two. The first is "Charter Wartime,"235 which includes the special
rules (lex specialis)2 3 6 prescribed by the U.N. Charter (fus ad bellum) and
international instruments like the Geneva Conventions to regulate armed conflicts
(fus in bello). Usually known as "humanitarian law"23 7 and sometimes referred to
as "the hostilities paradigm,"238 these international rules are conventionally
understood to govern armed conflicts between sovereigns, as well as conflicts that
may take place in a single territory between a government and opposition forces.
Notably, the Charter Wartime framework has the advantage of suspending the laws
of "normal life." When this framework is turned on, sovereigns may use force in
ways that are impermissible otherwise. Thus, for an arguer with a disposition to
justify a drone strike, it is highly desirable to make her way into the explanatory
narrative of Charter Wartime. Why would one have such a disposition or
orientation? It could be for many reasons, and as discussed above, it may very well
be unconscious, or it could be that the arguer feels that this is the most appropriate
framework on the merits. For others, the decision may be strategic, but the present
point is simply this: All arguers bring an orientation to the legal materials, whether
they know it or not.

234.
235.

See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
See infra notes Part I.B.

236.

According to Melzer, "[s]ince

1mny

(but not all) values protected by

[international humanitarian law] are also protected by human rights law, and since IHL and
human rights law apply simultaneously in situations of armed conflict, the question arises as
to what extent human rights law influences the regulation of the conduct of hostilities. As a
general rule, the role of human rights law in regulating the conduct of hostilities is very
limited because it is superseded by IHL according to the principle of lex specialis
generalibus derogat. Where the lex specialis of IHL provides a rule designed for a concrete
situation it takes precedence over the continuously applicable lex generalis of human rights,
regardless of whether that rule is more or less precise." NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 382 (2009).
237.
International humanitarian law is associated with the rules of fighting, and
not the question of whether it was permissible to fight in the first place. The former question
is associated with the jus in bello, while the latter is called the jus ad bellum.
238.
Melzer argues that it is a mistake to conflate the "hostilities" paradigm with
humanitarian law, as humanitarian law often regulates conduct outside of strict designations
of hostilities. I have no quarrel with this, but the point has little effect on the way I am using
the frameworks in this analysis. MELZER, supra note 236, at 81-82.
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The second explanatory framework is Charter Peacetime," 9 which
includes the general rules (lex generalis) prescribed by the U.N. Charter and
international instruments like the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights to regulate the interactions between governments and individuals. Usually
associated with "human rights law" and sometimes referred to as "the law
enforcement paradigm,"240 these are the domestic and international rules
constraining govermnent action in its pursuit of criminals. One extensive area of
debate is whether suspected terrorists should be treated like criminals, in which
case governments would be restricted by human rights law in the amount and
degree of force they can use, or like soldiers, in which case they may justifiably be
killed in many sorts of circumstances. For an arguer looking to conclude that drone
strikes are often illegal, the Charter Peacetime framework is usually preferred
because there is far less leeway for sovereigns to kill under human rights law than
there is under the laws of war.
Although I do not believe that any single interpretive orientation
necessarily leads the judge to one explanatory framework, there do seem to be
elective affinities in play. These affinities seem apparent in the context of the
communitarian and individualist orientations, leading the judge to the
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and international human
rights law. It also seems apparent in the realist orientation, leading the judge away
from international law and toward domestic law. In the case of the statist
orientation, however, the judge seems caught up in a piece of metaphorical
schizophrenia.
A. Four Interpretive Orientations
In light of the discussion of interpretive orientations from above, there are
at least four orientations that might prefigure a judge's approach to the legality of a
drone strike. I label these orientations realism, communitarianism, individualism,
and statism.241
Recall that an interpretive orientation is usually unconscious, and acts like
a sort of deep lens the judge uses to prefigure the field of materials that needs to be
organized and explained in the form of a narrative argument.242 Once again,
Kelman's description is helpful:
[Interpretive] constructs are sometimes unconscious techniques of
sorting out legal material and are sometimes consciously held
political or philosophical beliefs, although even the consciously held
239.
See infra notes 306-32.
240.
MELZER, supra note 236, at 81-82.
241.
I will not highlight this point moving forward, but there do seem to me to be
direct linkages between these interpretive orientations and White's analysis of tropes.
Conununitarianism suggests the use of synecdoche, individualism suggests the use of
metonymy, and statism suggests a blending of metonymy and metaphor. The structuralist
mode of organizing the field, which I am using here, suggests irony.
242.
Tropes orchestrate parole. KAJA SILVERMAN, THE SUBJECT OF SEMIOTICS 87
(1984).
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argument can be made only after a fact pattern is characterized by
interpretive constructs. Once these constructs operate, a single legal
result seems inevitable, a result seemingly deduced on general
principle. These constructs appear both in conscious and
unconscious forms in standard legal discourse. 243
As White explained, such interpretive orientations "are paradigms of the
operations by which consciousness can prefigure areas of experience that are
cognitively problematic in order to subsequently submit them to analysis and
explanation. That is to say, in linguistic usage itself, thought is provided with
possible alternative paradigms of explanation."244 Also, recall that while the
interpretive orientation is powerfully constraining in its ability to direct the judge
in certain directions rather than others, these constraints are purely about form. An
interpretive orientation governs the style in which the narratives will be built; it
has little if anything to do with the substantive conclusions the judge will reach.
Despite this formal quality, however, it is critical to remember just how
substantive form can be.
1. Realism

A realist orientation toward the field of international law may take any
number of forms. In both the communitarian and individualist positions described
below, the jurist prefigures the field in the way that he does very likely because he
believes that international law is most realistically understood in the terms of that
orientation. Thus, it is common to hear comments like: "Reality is best served
through sustained attention to the needs of the international community!" "No, a
realistic assessment of global welfare must begin with the protection of human
rights!" And so on. One scholar's realism is another scholar's utopia.
In the practice of international lawyers, however, realism has the most
conspicuous cache among those scholars that dismiss the reality of international
law altogether.245 In this view, realism recommends avoiding international law and
bringing focus to the loci of actual power, which has always been and always will
be domestic.246 International law, it turns out, is a mirage, and thus an evaluation
of the legality of drone strikes should be limited to an analysis of U.S. law.
Consequently, this realist orientation is unlikely to lead the arguer to legal
frameworks operating at the global level, and will probably carry her instead to
U.S. constitutional law, administrative law, or the law of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. This typically unpacks in analyses of U.S. prohibitions on
243.
Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive CriminalLaw, 33
L. REv. 591, 592-93 (1981).
244.
WHITE, METAHISTORY, supra note 34, at 36.
245.
For the initial break with international law and the beginning of a more
realistic view of international relations, see E.H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEAR CRISIS, 19191939: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1964); GEORGE
KENNAN, REALITIES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1954); HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS
AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (1948).
246.
See CARR, supra note 245.
STAN.
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assassinations, 4 7 congressional authorization on the use of military force after
9/11,248 and whether due process requirements attach to CIA and U.S. military
forces when they kill people outside of U.S. territory and who were never in U.S.
custody.24 9
The discussion in the rest of this Article brackets this orientation about
the irrelevance of international law, but not because legal frameworks dealing with
the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) and the U.S. Constitution are any
less important than the ones canvassed below. I bracket it because it leads to a
singular focus on domestic frameworks-an orientation that excludes global law
from the relevant vocabulary. 2 50

247.
This discussion falls under the ban on "assassination," dating to Senate
investigations in the 1970s regarding the reported activities of CIA agents. The results of the
investigation called for a statutory ban on the participation of U.S. agents in assassination
attempts abroad, but President Gerald Ford instead issued an executive order. Outside the
context of war, the basic contours of the idea were that U.S. agents were prohibited from
targeting and killing individuals in foreign territory for politically motivated reasons. While
the order made assassination illegal, it also left the question open as to what might fall
within the porous borders of the concept. There is a distinct prohibition in the context of
war. For discussion, see MELZER, supra note 236, at 45-51; William C. Banks & Peter
Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and Assassination: The U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U.
RICH. L. REv. 667, 717-26 (2003); Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of
Targeted Killing, 1 HARv. NAT'L SEC. J. 145 (2010); Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence
Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate, 5 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 539
(2012); John C. Dehn & Kevin Jon Heller, Debate, Targeted Killing: The Case of Anwar
Al-Aulaqi, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 175 (2010); Richard Murphy & Afsheen John
Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOzO L. REv. 405, 450
(2009); Vlasic, supra note 227, at 45-51.
248.
See Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution:
Iraq and the Crisis ofPresidentialLegality, 109 MICH. L. REv. 447 (2011).
249.
Richard Murphy and Afsheen John Radsan have argued that the Supreme

Court's recent decisions in "Hamdi/Boumediene suggests a sound model for judicial control
of targeted killings under which courts, applying duly deferential standards, might-on rare
occasions-determine the legality of attacks after they occur. Due process requires at least
this minimal level of judicial control." Murphy & Radsan, supra note 247, at 450. They are
also keen at the same time to limit judicial intervention. "Given the limited role of courts in
national security, it is imperative for the executive to develop internal procedures to ensure
accuracy of targeted killings and accountability for the officials who order them. Both the

Supreme Court of Israel and the European Court of Human Rights have ruled that targeted
killings conducted in counter-terrorism operations must receive close, independent review
within the executive branch. We explain why due process demands the same of American
authorities. If the CIA has not already done so, it should put these procedures in place to
help bring Predator strikes within the rule of law." Id.
250.
Nevertheless, despite the lack of attention I give to this orientation, its style
is apparent. If you identify an arguer with a realist orientation, there is a good chance she
will be attracted to the frameworks mentioned above.
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2. Communitarianism

The way of prefiguring the field of international legal materials that I am
calling "communitarian" emphasizes a whole/particular dichotomy which tends to
privilege the whole.251 In this position, the jurist understands the world as an
organic totality essentially defined by its universalism rather than its particularity.
The communitarian position does not reject the particular, nor deny that
individualism is critically important. It is rather that the nature and function of the
particular can best be understood in its relation with other particulars, and in the
overall context of the whole. Thus, this mode of prefiguration is integrative rather
than reductive: The jurist organizes the field of international law by understanding
it first as a field of connections, ultimately defined as an international community.
The welfare of the particulars (i.e., states, multinational corporations,
nongovermnental organizations, individuals) is seen as a function of the welfare of
the community.
In the context of international law, a communitarian orientation may lead
a jurist to identify particular international organizations with the community. For
some, the international community may be best reflected in the World Trade
Organization, who will consider the rules and jurisprudence of that institution as
especially important in organizing international relations.252 Others might have
more allegiance to the ICJ and the United Nations General Assembly,253 while
others still might frame the intemational community in Emmanuel Wallerstein's
conception of core and periphery.254 In such a case, the peripheral and
semiperipheral community is perceived as the real "international community," and
the field of international law is prefigured accordingly.255
251.
The communitarian orientation therefore has much in common with the trope
of synecdoche: There are "qualitative relationship[s] among the elements of a totality-it is
integrative rather than reductive. Unlike the Metonymical expression 'fifty sail,' used as a
figure for 'fifty ships,' it is meant to signal not simply a name change but a name change
designating a totality ... which possesses some quality ... that suffuses and constitutes the
essential nature of all the parts that make it up. As a Metonymy, it suggests a relationship
among the various parts of the body which is to be understood in terms of the central
function of the heart among those parts. As a Synecdoche, however, the expression suggests
a relationship among the parts of the [unity], considered as a combination of physical and
spiritual attributes, which is qualitative in nature and in which all of the parts participate."
WHITE, METAHISTORY, supra note 34, at 36.
252.
The work of Ernst-Ulrich Petersmanm comes to mind. See, e.g., ERNSTULRICH PETERSMANN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN THE 21sT CENTURY:
CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AND MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF INTERDEPENDENT PUBLIC
GOODS (2012).

253.
See, e.g., Manley 0. Hudson, The Permanent Court ofInternationalJustice,
35 HARv. L. REV. 245 (1922).
254.
See IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD SYSTEM 1: CAPITALIST
AGRICULTURE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN WORLD-ECONOMY IN THE SIXTEENTH

CENTURY (1974).
255.
For an illustration, see Amulf Becker Lorca, Rules for the 'Global War on

Terror': Implying Consent and Presuming Conditionsfor Intervention, 45 NYU J. INT'L L
& POL. 1, 12-13 (2012).

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

162

[VOL. 56:117

The communitarian orientation is not required to understand the global
totality in any of these terms; rather, it is a way of prefiguring the field that is
enamored with the idea of international community, but when it comes to defining
the meaning of community-choosing which community is really the international
one-the communitarian orientation is indeterminate. The communitarian
orientation, like the ones that follow, is only an organizing mechanism. It is not a
blueprint for legal argument, but rather a means for signaling to the jurist what will
be the most desirable form that the argument might take.
3. Individualism

In this third interpretive orientation, the jurist prefigures the field of
international law by adopting a preference for the particular rather than the
whole.25 6 It is not that the individualist denies the value of thinking in terms of the
international community, as the realist might. It is perfectly plausible, and quite
common I think, for a jurist prefiguring the field in this way to believe in the
desirability of both individual flourishing and a robust international community.
But the point is that the individualist understands the welfare of the whole-of the
community-as a necessary effect of the welfare of the individual human being,
rather than focusing solely on the international community, as does the
communitarian. Community is essentially reduced to the individual, and references
to human rights are used as a way of referencing the global community.25 7 Thus,
when jurists evoke the whole of the global law of killing through reference to
Anwar al-Awlaki, this is a mark of organizing the field in a whole/particular
relation that uses the particular as a substitute for the whole.258 This is the
sensibility that instructs us to see sovereign states and international organizations
as just so many individuals, and that at the bottom of all things is the morally
autonomous and crucially important figure of the individual person.
Again, this interpretive orientation organizes the form of international
legal argument for the jurist in such a way that it privileges the particular against
the whole, but it does not tell the jurist anything about how to define or evaluate
individual rights. However, it does assist the jurist in establishing that the
individual will be the place to begin and orient her approach to the argument.
4. Statism

In the interpretive orientation I am identifying as statism, the jurist
prefigures the field in two steps. Initially, this position looks a lot like the
individualist position: It looks out at international law and reduces that system to
the priority of the sovereign state. Thus, unlike the integrating mode of the
communitarian position, the statist conceives the world in whole/particular terms,
where the whole is benefited when the particular is benefited. But unlike the

256.

See

257.

See id. at 35.

258.

See

WHITE, METAHISTORY
CHANDLER,

supra note 34, at 34.

supra note 35;

ANTHONY WILDEN, THE RULES ARE

GAME: THE STRATEGY OF COMMUNICATION 198 (1987).
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reductive mode of individualism, the statist conflates the particular with the state,
rather than the human being.
The statist prefiguration, however, does not simply substitute the
individual for the state. In this mode's second step, it empowers its interpretation
by analogizing the state directly with the individual. The statist mode is therefore
representational in character in a way that neither the communitarian nor the
individualist orientations are. In those orientations, the community and the
individual are given priority due to their ontological status. The community is the
orienting concept because it is the true universal; the individual is the orienting
concept because it is the true particular. They are the real. But the sovereign state
is identified as the key organizing concept in the statist position due to a metaphor:
The sovereign state enjoys privileged status in the international order because it is
analogized to the rights individuals enjoyed in a hypothesized state of nature. A
deep and unwavering similarity is posited between the state and the individual,
empowering the state with rights that are individual in origin, despite the
understanding that the similarity is only figurative.259 The state is never reduced to
the individual; it is analogized to the individual. 260
Even if we have identified a judge's tropological prefiguration of the field
in either the terms of communitarianism or individualism, we still cannot know
how the judge will ultimately decide to make his argument. We only know
something about the form the argument is likely to take. The communitarian and
individualist orientations are more likely to lead the jurist toward the Charter
Peacetime framework. It is not that the judge will necessarily do so, but these
orientations are more likely than not going to foreground the materials associated
with the ICJ and international human rights law.
The statist orientation, in contrast, does not seem to have any elective
affinities with either the Charter Peacetime or the Charter Wartime frameworks.
Anticipating a bit the discussion to follow below, an orientation in favor of
sovereign rights cuts powerfully in both directions. On one side, the statist
orientation pushes the legal mind (through metaphor) toward the seminal
importance of a state's natural and inherent right to self-preservation. This is quite
different from the technical parsing of self-defense described below in the context
of the ICJ's jurisprudence. It is instead the idea that sovereign states possess in
international relations what individuals possess in a hypothetical state of nature: a
right to life, and an attendant right to take whatever actions the person deems
necessary to stay alive.2 6 1 Self-preservation is completely subjective. There are no
See WHITE, METAHISTORY, supra note 34, at 34.
For a general discussion of how metaphors function in this way, see GEORGE
LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980).
261.
Hobbes's version of the state of nature was constantly in the shadow of
anarchy and violence, just as so many writers would later claim the international plane to be
similarly situated. For Hobbes, "because the condition of Man ... is a condition of Warre of
every one against every one, in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and
there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life
against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a right to every
259.
260.
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niceties here, no ultimate limits about what a person is justifiably able to do if he
perceives a real threat.2 62 When international lawyers interpret Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter as a right of self-defense that allows states to kill nonstate actors with
few if any territorial restrictions, and without limitation as to how long they may
continue to track down and kill these people-even decades-they are likely

arguing from an orientation that draws an analogy between a classic sovereign
right of self-preservation and individual rights in a state of nature.2 63 This is a
powerful and basic international legal idea that has a pedigree centuries long, and
which is certainly categorical to the foundations of the U.N. Charter itself.264 It is

thing.; even to one another's body."

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 63 (Seven Treasures
Publ'ns 2009). This forms a fundamental law of nature: "By all means we can, to defend
ourselves." Id. at 64. Following Hobbes, Vattel explained, "every nation is obliged to
perform the duty of self-preservation." EMER DE VATThL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 69 (Joseph
Chitty & Edward D. Ingraham eds., 1883). "Since then a nation is obliged to preserve itself,
it has a right to every thing necessary for its preservation. For the Law of Nature gives us a
right to every thing, without which we cannot fulfill our obligation . . . ." Id. at 70. "A
nation or state has a right to every thing that can help to ward off imninent danger, and
keep at a distance whatever is capable of causing its ruin; and that from the very same
reasons that establish its right to the things necessary to its preservation." Id. at 71.
262.
See HOBBES, supra note 261, at 63-64; VATTEL, supra note 261, at 69-71.
See also, C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM:
HOBBES TO LOCKE (2011).
263.
International lawyers have long been drawn to the "state of nature" construct,
and Thomas Hobbes's own version of it has been especially influential. Writing in 1757, the
immensely popular Emer Vattel claimed that "Hobbes was, I believe, the first who gave a

distinct though imperfect idea of the law of nations .

. .

. This author has well observed, that

the law of nations is the law of nature applied to states or nations." VATTEL, supra note 261,
at ix. "Nations being composed of men naturally free and independent, and who, before the
establishment of civil societies, lived together in the state of nature,-Nationsor sovereign
states are to be considered as so many free persons living together in the state of nature." Id.
at 52. Samuel Pufendorf was similarly smitten. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF
NATURE AND NATIONS 149-52 (2005).
264.
For sample writings in the nineteenth century, see WILLIAM EDWARD HALL,
A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 278 (7th ed. 1917) ("In the last resort almost the whole
of the duties of states are subordinated to the right of self-preservation. Where law affords
inadequate protection to the individual he must be permitted, if his existence is in question,
to protect himself by whatever means may be necessary; and it would be difficult to say that
any act not inconsistent with the nature of a moral being is forbidden, so soon as it can be
proved that by it, and it only, self-preservation can be secured."); HENRY WHEATON,
ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 89-90 (Richard Henry Dana, Jr. ed., 1866) ("Of the
absolute international rights of states, one of the most essential and important, and that
which lies at the foundation of the rest, is the right of self-preservation. It is not only a right
with respect to other States, but a duty with respect to its own members, and the most
solemn and important which the State owes to them. This right necessarily involves all other
incidental rights, which are essential as means to give effect to the principal end. Among
these is the right of self-defense."). In terms of the Charter, and the ideology that generated
its adoption, see GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL
SOVEREIGNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 165-93 (2004).
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an idea that belongs to a tradition that, in a different era, was known as natural

law. 265
There is, however, a second sovereign right that is equally powerful, with
just as admirable a pedigree-in fact, precisely the same pedigree. Enshrined in
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and elsewhere is the canonical argument (again
through metaphor) holding all sovereigns to be free and equal. 2 66 In this view, the
very definition of sovereignty is that a sovereign has the ultimate right to define
within its own territorial borders its own political, economic, social, and cultural
life story. 267 Sovereigns have absolute and exclusive jurisdiction-all of them. 268

265.
Natural law does not exactly have a great reputation today, and I do not mean
to suggest that the sovereign rights orientation I am describing here is a purely natural law
conception, or even that it is at odds with positivism. My point is merely that international
lawyers have long argued for an analogy between individual rights and sovereign rights, and
that arguments are named differently as a matter of when in time they are being argued.
Today, what is sometimes called a "naked" right of self-defense may have at another time
been called a "natural" right. For a typical critique, see Michael Glennon, How
InternationalRules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939, 941-46 (2005).
266.
The U.N. Declaration on Friendly Relations states: "No State or group of
States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all
other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or
against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international
law .... The use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation
of their inalienable rights and of the principle of non-intervention." G.A. Res. 26/2625, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970).
267.
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 111 (June 27) ("The Court should now mention the principle of
respect for State sovereignty, which in international law is of course closely linked with the
principles of the prohibition of the use of force and of non-intervention. The basic legal
concept of State sovereignty in customary international law, expressed in, inter alia, Article
2. paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, extends to the internal waters and territorial
sea of every State and to the air space above its territory. As to superjacent air space, the
1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (Art. 1) reproduces the
established principle of the complete and exclusive sovereignty of a State over the air space
above its territory. That convention, in con-junction with the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the Territorial Sea, further specifies that the sovereignty of the coastal State extends to the
territorial sea and to the air space above it, as does the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea adopted on 10 December 1982."); S.S. "Lotus", 1927 I.C.J. 4, 19 (Sep. 7)
("[A]11 that can be required of a State is that it should not overstep the limits which
international law places upon its jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to exercise
jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty.").
268.
John Marshall stated in The Schooner Exchange that "[t]he jurisdiction of the
nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no
limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external
source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an
investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such
restriction." Schooner Exchange v. Mcfaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812). It is an idea that
played a central role in the history of international legal argument since at least the
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The strength of this claim, like the claim of self-preservation, also draws on the
human right of self-determination that individuals enjoy in a state of nature. To
understand the sovereign right to equal freedom is to understand the individual's
right to be his or her own person.
As a consequence of these twin imperatives, the statist orientation
schizophrenically prefigures the field in such a way that the jurist might head in
the direction of either the Charter Peacetime or Charter Wartime frameworks. The
result depends largely on whether the prefiguration has foregrounded the right of
self-defense or the right of equality. In other words, claims for a strong and
expansive interpretation of Article 51, as well as claims for strong and restrictive
interpretations of Article 2(4), are equally rooted in deeply classical metaphors
about the international legal order. Consequently, scholars who complain about the
primacy of sovereignty in the context of terrorism are often themselves arguing
from a posture that is similarly committed to sovereignty. They just happen to be
on the other side of the sovereign rights divide.
B. Two Explanatory Frameworks
In contrast to the judge's preconceptual interpretive orientation, there are
modes of explanation that commonly recur in the context of a particular legal
domain. Though orientation and explanation are distinct, an interpretive
orientation often suggests signals about the sort of explanation the judge is likely
to make. As Hayden White has suggested, "historical explanations are bound to be
based on different metahistorical presuppositions about the nature of the historical
field, presuppositions that generate different conceptions of the kind of
explanations that can be used in historiographical analysis." 269 Thus, when the
judge identifies the facts in the terms of some set of legal materials-this is the
crucial act of determining materiality-the judge is providing this kind of
explanation. If we need to know whether the facts have given rise to an instance of
illegality, the judge will need to craft some way of explaining how this may have

happened. 270
In the literature on drones, scholars typically use the two explanatory
frameworks I introduced above in order to explicate the legality of this new form
of violence. The Charter Peacetime and Charter Wartime frameworks, as their
names suggest, have a common source in the U.N. Charter. In the paragraphs that
follow, I recount a customary explanation for how the frameworks are meant to
function. As I will explain, this recounting-by beginning with the Charter itself
and the ICJ's interpretation of it rather than with some other artifact-already
signals the play of a communitarian orientation.

seventeenth century. See WILHELM
(Michael Byers trans., 2000).
269.
270.

GEORGE GREWE, EPOCHS

OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW

supra note 34, at 13.
I present an idiosyncratic illustration, in the context of a hypothetical drone
WHITE, METAHISTORY,

strike, in Part III.
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Since World War II, when a sovereign has desired violence in the
territory of another sovereign, the violence is meant to be governed by the U.N.
Charter.27 1 In the first chapter of the Charter, the fourth paragraph of Article 2
states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 272
As a consequence of this rule, Chapter VII of the Charter allows for two kinds of
military force in international relations: armed attacks authorized by the Security
Council 273 and exercise of a sovereign right of self-defense. Article 51 states:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security."274
The set of rules governing the legal right to use military force are known
as the jus ad bellum. 275 Two questions in the jus ad bellum concern the proper way
to define the language in Article 51 about "armed attack," and whether attacks on
states by nonstate actors may trigger Article 51 at all. While it is clear that the
necessary threshold of intensity of hostilities for constituting international armed
conflicts is lower than that for the noninternational sort, the ICJ has held that
sporadic, low-intensity hostilities between two sovereigns may be insufficient to
trigger article 51.276 The Court has also stated that Article 51 cannot be triggered
by nonstate actors, and that all armed attacks must be imputable to another

271.

Article 1 of the U.N. Charter lists the first purpose of the United Nations:

"To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and
in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement
of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace." U.N.
Charter art. 1, para. 1.
272.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
273.
Article 39 of the U.N. Charter states: "The Security Council shall determine
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles
41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N. Charter art. 39.
274.
U.N. Charter art. 51.
275.
The beginnings of "just war theory" are usually cited back to Thomas
Aquinas's Aristotelian defense of the idea in his Summa Theologica. A more modem
exposition in the style of the Columbia School of international legal theory is THOMAS M.
FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS

(2009).
276.
See Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States) 2003 I.C.J. 161, 191 (Nov. 6)
("Even taken cumulatively, and reserving, as already noted, the question of Iranian
responsibility, these incidents do not seem to the Court to constitute an armed attack on the
United States of the kind that the court, in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua, qualified as a -most grave form of the use of force.");
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, 101-02 (June 27).
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sovereign.77 Iin the case of armed attacks that can be traced back to sovereigns, all
reprisals by the injured state under Article 51 must be both "necessary" and
"proportionate," 2 78 and strictly limited to the terms of Article 2(4).279 In deciding
whether self-defense is legally justifiable, the court has emphasized that this is not
a matter left to the subjective discretion of the injured state, and that a proper
exercise of self-defense must be objectively justified.280
In contrast to the jus ad bellum is the jus in bello. 28 1 There are two
sources for the jus in bello-rules governing the conduct of fighting once the
fighting has already been initiated-and they are international treaties and
international custom. The ICJ has delineated at least three fundamental rules in the
jus in bello from these sources. The first is "distinction," and it demands that
military forces distinguish between individuals that may lawfully be killed and
those who may not.282 Depending on whether the dispute has been classified as an
277.
See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 222-23 (Dec. 19) ("It is further to be noted that,
while Uganda claimed to have acted in self-defence, it did not ever claim that it had been
subjected to an armed attack by the armed forces of the DRC. The 'armed attacks' to which
reference was made came rather from the ADF. The Court has found above (paragraphs
131-35) that there is no satisfactory proof of the involvement in these attacks, direct or
indirect, of the Government of the DRC."); Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 103.
278.
Iran Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 198 (Nov. 6) ("The submission of the
exercise of the right of self-defence to the conditions of necessity and proportionality is a
rule of customary international law."); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 245 (July 8) ("A use of force that is proportionate under
the law of self-defense, must, in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the law
applicable in armed conflict which compromise in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law."); Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 103. But see id. at 94 ("The Court therefore
finds that Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a 'natural' or
'inherent' right of self-defence, and it is hard to see how this can be other than of a
customary nature, even if its present content has been confirmed and influenced by the
Charter. Moreover the Charter, having itself recognized the existence of this right, does not
go on to regulate directly all aspects of its content. For example, it does not contain any
specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to
the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary
international law.").
279.
See Iran Oil Platforms,2003 I.C.J. at 183.
280.
Id.
281.
See MELZER, supra note 236, at 244.
282.
See Armed Activities, 2005 J.C.J. at 240. Article 48 of Protocol I states: "In
order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the
Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct
their operations only against military objectives." Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) art. 48, June 8, 1977, http://www.icrc.org/
ihl/INTRO/380. Although parallel language does not appear in Protocol II, the principle of
distinction applies in noninternational conflicts as a matter of customary international law.
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Convention Between the United States and Other
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"international armed conflict"283 or a "noninternational armed conflict,"8 4 dhe
class of people who may be lawfully killed is different.285 In an armed conflict
between two or more sovereigns, military targets must be limited to the enemy
sovereign's combatants, along with civilians that directly participate in the

hostilities.28 6 Nonmilitary, nonparticipating people do not belong to the class of
individuals who may be lawfully killed.287 In an armed conflict between a
sovereign and one or more nonstate actors, it is trickier to define "combatant"
because the dispute is not between traditional military organizations.288 But despite
the difficulties, the Geneva Conventions require some objective measure for
distinguishing fighters from nonfighters.289 Current thinking about the principle of
distinction in noninternational armed conflicts suggests that military targets should
be limited to people that have either assumed a continuous combat function or

those who are directly participating in the fighting.290 A second rule is

Powers Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, art. 25, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter War on Land, Annex].
283.
See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, The Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, Common Art. 2(1) [hereinafter Geneva Conventions I -I; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case
No. IT-94-I-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Forumer Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); INT'L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE
WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES INTHE FIELD 32 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952).
284.
Under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, nonstate actors can be
parties to an armed attack. Further, noninternational armed conflicts can even be between

nonstate actors, without any state involvement at all.
285.
See generally, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 114-15 (June 27).
286.
See War on Land, Annex, supra note 282, at arts. 1-2 (explaining that the
"laws, rights, and duties of war" apply to: 1) a member of the regular armed forces of a
belligerent party; 2) a member of "militia and volunteer corps ... commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates[,] . . . [with] a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a
distance[,] . . . [that] carries arms openly[,] and . . . conduct[s] their operations in

accordance with the laws and customs of war"; and 3) an inhabitant of a non-occupied
territory "who, on approach of the enemy, spontaneously take[s] up armas to resist the

invading troops . . ."). See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, supra note 282, at art. 4.
287.
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra
note 282, at art. 4; War on Land, Annex, supra note 282, at arts. 1-2.
288.
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra
note 282, at art. 4; War on Land, Annex, supra note 282, at arts. 1-2.
289.
See Geneva ConventionsI IV, supra note 283.
290.
See NILS MELZER, INT'L COMM. FOR THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN LAW 1039 (2009) ("[I]n case of doubt as to whether a [sic] specific civilian
conduct qualifies as direct participation in hostilities, it must be presumed that the general
rule of civilian protection applies and that this conduct does not amount to direct

participation in hostilities. The presumption of civilian protection applies, afortiori,in case
of doubt as to whether a person has become a member of an organized armed group

belonging to a party to the conflict. Obviously, the standard of doubt applicable to targeting
decisions cannot be compared to the strict standard of doubt applicable in criminal
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"proportionality."2 1 Here, the rule is that the advantage of using military force in
an armed conflict must be gauged by offsetting externalities suffered by civilian
populations. Where possible, the use of force should be curtailed so as to minimize
civilian casualties.292 A third governing rule is "necessity," which predictably
requires that an attack be necessary for accomplishing some military purpose, and
forbids the cause of unnecessary suffering on the part of combatants.293
The Charter Wartime framework is generally regarded as abnormal. The
normal default is peacetime, where international human rights law is assumed to
govern those "abnormal" moments when sovereigns kill. Like humanitarian law,
human rights law restricts the rights of sovereigns to kill through the rules of
necessity and proportionality,294 but in the context of those rules operating during
peacetime (lex generalis), these terms have a lot more bite. Human rights law
presumes an absolute prohibition on the arbitrary taking of human life.295 The
question therefore becomes whether the targeted killing is arbitrary; the killing will

proceedings but rather must reflect the level of certainty that can reasonably be achieved in
the circumstances."); see also Geneva ConventionsI 1H, supra note 283, at Common Art. 3,
AP 1, art. 52(1) and (2); AP 1, art. 50(1); HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE § 5(a) (Harvard University Program on
Humanitarian
Policy
and
Conflict
http://www.ihlresearch.org/amw/manual.

Research

2009),

available

at

291.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) arts.
35(1) & 51(5) (1977); see also id. art. 35(1) ("[T]he right of the Parties to the conflict to
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.").
292.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 245 (July
8) ("A use of force that is proportionate under the law of self-defense, must, in order to be
lawful, also meet the requirements of the law applicable in armed conflict which
compromise in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.").
293.
The ICJ has explained that among the principles of international
humanitarian law is the prohibition on causing unnecessary suffering to combatants.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 257 (July 8). The U.S.
Army Field Manual explains, 'military necessity' . . . has been defined as that principle
which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which are indispensable
for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible." U.S. DEP'T OF THE
ARmy, FIELD MANUAL No. 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 4
3 (1956),
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military Law/pdf/law warfare-1956.pdf.
294.
U.N. Secretary General, Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions,
33-45, U.N. Doc. A/61/311 (September 5, 2006); Human Rights Comnittee, General
Comment No. 6, 3, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (2003); see also, generally, Inter-American
Commrission of Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 116 (2002).
295.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that the right

to life is absolute, and individuals may not be deprived of that right arbitrarily. International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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only be justifiable when there are no other possible means available to save
another human life.296
While this much is relatively uncontroversial, the geographical
application of human rights law is not. 297 On the one side are arguments claiming a
strict territorial aspect of human rights obligations.298 Unless we are in the field of
customary or peremptory norms governing all states, the conventional law is found
in treaties adopted by states and which have entered into force.299 In these treaties,
human rights claims are only good when a citizen is making a claim against his
own government,300 thus triggering the presumption that governments are typically
obliged to respect their human rights obligations on their own territory, or possibly
with regard to their own nationals in foreign territory. Under this reading of human
rights law, individuals cannot make human rights claims against harms they have
suffered at the hands of foreign states.301 To get compensation, they will have to
press their own governments into the service of their claims.302
On the other hand is the position more favorable to the advocate wishing
to use human rights law in order to condemn a drone strike. Here, one points out
the arguments claiming that a sovereign invited to intervene in another sovereign's
civil war is bound by the same human rights obligations as the host state.303 That
is, the host state cannot empower an intervening state to violate human rights
norms which it itself is bound to respect.304 This argument short-circuits the
problem of extraterritoriality by rooting the human rights obligations of the
intervening state in the obligations of the host state, and not in the obligations the
intervening state has against its own citizens in its own territory.305 The upshot is
that the applicability of human rights law to instances of targeted killing in foreign
territories is a colorable argument, if not a winning one, when the host state has
consented to the strikes.
1. The CharterPeacetimeFramework
As I alluded to above, the notion that peacetime is normal and wartime is

abnormal is a figuration we should associate with the communitarian and
individualist orientations. It is also from these positions that the ICJ's
jurisprudence, and the U.N. Charter itself, emerge as foregrounded artifacts for
296.
Human Rights Conunittee, supra note 294; Inter-American Conmission of
Human Rights, supra note 294.
297.
For general
discussion,
see
generally,
MARKO
MILANOVIC,
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (2011).
298.
Id at 124.
299.
Id; see also, MELZER, supra note 236.
300.
ICCPR, supranote 295.
301.
MILANOVIC, supra note 297.
Id
302.
303.
See generally, Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat
Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004 2009, (Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 0943, 2010), http://ssrn.conabstract=1501144.
Id
304.
Id
305.
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legal analysis. Phillip Alston and Mary Ellen O'Connell are representative scholars
generally oriented to the Charter Peacetime framework in the context of drone
strikes.30 6 They have consistently argued against the idea that transformations in
the global order have necessitated shifts in the traditional laws of killing.30 7 Neither
Alston nor O'Connell deny that states have a right of self-defense that might be
triggered by terrorist attack, that such a right is constrained by rules of necessity
and proportionality, or that it would be a mistake to identify the use of drones for
targeted killing as a per se violation of international law.308 Rather, these scholars
preconceive the field of argument in such a way that the Charter's positive
prohibitions on the use of force are emphasized over these more metaphorical
arguments in favor of states' rights. 3 09
As Alston points out in his report as Special Rapporteur to the U.N., some
of the main points of contention around the applicability of wartime frameworks
have turned on (1) whether the right of self-defense can be triggered by terrorist
attacks and whether such attacks amount to "armed conflicts"; (2) whether a
"naked" right of self-defense can be exercised when arguments about the presence
of armed conflicts are unavailing; and (3) whether the right of self-defense comes
ready-made with an expiration date. 3 10
Alston's argument with respect to these questions takes its explanatory
form in the peacetime framework. This choice appears to flow from an antistatist
orientation. For Alston, Article 51 is a subsidiary article in the context of the U.N.
Charter and cannot be taken to revitalize a view of sovereigns wielding rights of
self-defense in a state of nature. At the same time, Alston is willing to entertain
306.
See, e.g., Phillip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders, 2
HARv. NAT'L SEC. J. 283 (2011) [hereinafter Alston, CIA]; Alston et al., supra note 227;
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, supra note 224;
Mary Ellen O'Connell, Remarks: The Resort to Drones Under InternationalLaw, 39 DENV.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 585 (2011); Mary Ellen O'Connell, To Kill or Capture Suspects in the
Global War on Terror, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 325, 331 (2003); Mary Ellen O'Connell,
supra note 303; Mary Ellen O'Connell, Seductive Drones: Learning from a Decade of
Lethal Operations, (Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 11-35, 2011) [hereinafter
O'Connell,
Seductive
Drones],
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1912635; Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Choice of Law Against Terrorism, 4 J.
NAT'L SEC. L & POL'Y 343 (2010); W. Michael Ramsden, Targeted Killings and
InternationalHuman Rights Law: The Case ofAnwar al-Awlaki, 16 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L.
385 (2011); Sikander Ahmed Shah, War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation Enduring
Freedom, and the Legality of U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REv. 77, 115 (2010).

307.
O'Connell, supra note 303, at 12 ("In the period under review, international
law contained a clear and up-to-date set of principles governing the use of force."); see also
Sean Murphy, The InternationalLegality of US Military Cross-Border Operations from
Afghanistan to Pakistan, 85 INT'L L STUDIES 109 (2009).
308.
See infra notes 311-33.
309.
See generally Alston, CIA, supra note 306, at 290; O'Connell, supra note
303.
310.
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
supra note 224, at 39.
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the possibility that states do retain a right of self-defense against nonstate actors,
though he provides the caveat that it would only be in "very rare circumstances"
that nonstate actors would be capable of launching an armed attack against a
sovereign without the assistance of another sovereign.311 Given the ICJ's high
standard for an attack that triggers Article 51, Alston echoes the view that it is
highly unlikely that purely autonomous nonstate actors can pull off such
assaults. 12
Alston's analysis of the second issue is even less generous to those opting
for the Charter Wartime framework, insofar as he seems to read such scholars to
deny the applicability of international humanitarian law to the exercise of a preCharter right of self-defense.313 Alston worries that proponents of such a naturalist
right of self-defense really are seeking to eliminate the jus in bello in that context
For scholars like Alston, such a possibility seems quite likely, given the way their
explanatory mode situates the statist orientation as entirely hostile to Charter law.
For the third issue, Alston sees arguments seeking to enlarge the time limits for
legitimate exercise of Article 51 as unsupportable.3 14 The best view here,
according to Alston, "includes the right to use force against a real and imminent
threat when the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving
no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation. "315
When Alston turns more directly to the question of whether there is
presently a noninternational armed conflict between the United States and al
Qaeda and its associated forces, he expresses suspicion about the organizational
coherence of these groups, 316 as well as for the idea that the violence has been so
protracted that it can satisfy the requirements of the jus in bello. 3 17 Similarly,
Alston is pessimistic about the plausibility of drones' ability to adequately
discriminate lawful targets. "Outside the context of armed conflict, the use of
drones for targeted killing is almost never likely to be legal." 3 18 If a state were to
authorize drone killings on its own territory, Alston sees this as a likely human
rights violation; if they are authorized on foreign territory-again, outside of an
armed conflict-there are very few real-life examples where the necessity of
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ordering a drone kill would be instant and overwhelming, leaving no time for
deliberation or other less drastic options.319
Why, we can ask, is Alston telling the story this way? Why doubt the
organizational coherence of al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula where others do not?
Why doubt that the intensity of violence can reach the relevant standards? Why
doubt that the exercise of an inherent right of self-defense could include and be
disciplined by the jus in bello? One answer is that these doubts motivate the kind
of narrative Alston has chosen to explain the problem of drone strikes. Does this
mean that Alston is somehow insincere, or that, if he was more honest, his
argument would have taken a different narrative form? Of course not. But what it
does suggest is that having moved from a communitarian orientation into the
peacetime framework, the linguistic protocols of these choices are doing more of
the work than we might otherwise suspect.
Consider another example in the work of Mary Ellen O'Connell.320
Article 2(4), in her view, is "the most important rule on resort to force, and perhaps
in all of international law."3 2 1 Why? Why would anyone say something like that?
Again, this is a statement that makes perfect sense in tropological terms. Article
2(4) emerges as the most important rule in all of international law if we have
already prefigured the field in such a way that the Charter would be intensely
foregrounded. To be sure, O'Connell explains that Article 51 is a legitimate
exception to Article 2(4), but she sees it as a very narrow exception-a "term of
art" referring to a technical legal understanding, not as a metaphor about the
human right of self-preservation.3 2 2 O'Connell emphasizes that Article 51 can only
be triggered when the injured states have suffered an "armed attack" by another
sovereign state,3 23 conjuring up two immediate obstacles in the way of legitimating
drone kills: The arguer will need to explain both how the United States is
responding to an armed attack and that another state is responsible for the attack. 324
Drawing on the jurisprudence of the ICJ, O'Connell also claims that even if the
injured state can show that another state was responsible for an assault amounting
to an "armed attack," the response must be necessary and proportionate.3 25
In the case of assaults on sovereign governments by nonstate actors,
O'Connell suggests that "an armed response to a terrorist attack will almost never
meet these parameters for the lawful exercise of self-defense." 3 26 Again, why
would some scholars suggest that it could "almost never" be the case, while others
argue that it most certainly is? Are some of them lying, or just not as sharp as the
others? O'Connell defends her claim by suggesting that it is often unclear just who
was responsible for a terrorist attack, given the fleeting character and amorphous
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
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nature of terrorist organizations. "It usually takes some time to find out who the
perpetrators are and where they are. But force may not be used long after the terror
act as it loses its defensive character and becomes unlawful reprisal."32 7 With
respect to the U.S. War on Terror, O'Connell suggests that al Qaeda's 9/11 attacks
were indeed sufficient to constitute an armed attack, that Afghanistan was
complicit in the attacks, and that the United States had a legitimate claim to selfdefense under Article 51 to pursue al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.328 But
in terms of duration, O'Connell argues that the war of self-defense, which began in
late 2001, ended in 2002 upon the election of Hamid Karzai.32 9 Continued U.S.
military operations after that point should be justified on Afghanistan's request for
U.S. assistance in its internal armed conflict with Taliban and al Qaeda agents.
Thus, O'Connell believes that the use of drones in Afghanistan is justifiable so
long as their use complies with the jus in bello. This belief is part and parcel of the
narrative form of this argument. It belongs here.
As a consequence of having chosen this narrative mode, Alston and
O'Connell agree that a severely restricted view of Article 51 is desirable, as the
injured state will need to justify a military response through a showing that (1) the
initial assault was severe enough to amount to an "armed attack"; (2) there is
evidence that a sovereign state was responsible for the attack; and (3) the injured
state's response comes immediately after the initial assault. 330 O'Connell further
suggests a separate limitation: The injured state cannot safely rely on the consent
of the host state for the introduction of military engagement in the foreign
sovereign's territory. 33 1 The foreign sovereign can only consent to the sort of force
that it could itself use in its own territory, regulated both by its own domestic law,
human rights law, and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. 332
Having arranged the argument in this way, O'Connell has little trouble
concluding that drone killings are prohibited under international law. There is no
justification for using drones to target and kill people in foreign territory because
there is no armed conflict in place that might trigger the laws of war. Since there is
no armed conflict, drone kills demand justification under peacetime rules, and they
find none. Prohibitions on the extension of criminal law enforcement in the
territory of foreign sovereigns, human rights norms protecting individuals from
arbitrary killing, and, in the case of the United States, the federal ban on
assassinations, all push toward the conclusion that drone warfare is illegal.
In sum, the explanatory narrative supplied by the Charter Peacetime
framework has the following characteristics. First, the jurist shows that the choice
between the wartime and peacetime models is not all that hard, and that the
peacetime framework makes the most sense when dealing with questions about
drone strikes and al Qaeda. Second, this choice is, in part, prefigured by the jurist's
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
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interpretive orientation. For scholars like Alston and O'Connell, there is palpable
sympathy for a particular view of the ICJ's jurisprudence and the applicability of
human rights law. While I have not emphasized this aspect of the discussion, it is
also the case that a statist orientation could align quite nicely with this narrative:
The explanatory form of the Charter Peacetime framework will emerge in the
foreground of the statist orientation when the jurist has chosen the sovereign right
of self-determination as a trump over the sovereign right of self-defense. Third, the
Charter Peacetime framework reduces the relevance of humanitarian law, thereby
keeping in place the rules of lex generalis prohibiting targeted killing. Wartime
takes on an abnormal appearance. Finally, as constrained by a reasonable
application of human rights law, and in light of the sovereign right of autonomy,
drone killing of al Qaeda members will usually be illegal.
2. The Charter Wartime Framework

In a 2010 speech to the American Society of International Law,333 Harold
Koh began his treatment of drone killing by stating, "it is the considered view of
this Administration-and it has certainly been my experience during my time as
Legal Adviser-that U.S. targeting practices, including lethal operations
conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable
law, including the laws of war."334 Though Koh's argument is certainly based in
the U.N. Charter, and not in the state of nature, it actively contests the relevance of
the ICJ's jurisprudence and human rights law.33 Koh's position is better
understood as proceeding from a statist orientation. The second point is that while
Koh's argument does not operate in the state of nature framework, it appears to
proceed from a statist orientation.33 6 The explanatory narrative's distinctiveness is
found in the jurist's tendency to adopt a naturalist sovereign right of self-defense
and combine this with an affirmation of Article 51's wartime paradigm, thus at
once undermining the court's jurisprudence on the use of force as outdated and
reducing the relevance of human rights law.
Since the 9/11 attacks, Koh suggested, the United States has been in
armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, and thus "may
use force consistent with its inherent right of self-defense under international
law."33 7 This armed conflict continues to the present, as evidenced by al Qaeda's
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persistent attacks against U.S. personnel.33 In this context, Koh suggested that the
United States has authority under international law to use lethal force in the
targeted killing of individual al Qaeda members.339 Shifting from arguments about
self-defense to arguments about the boundaries of permissible fighting during
hostilities, Koh defended U.S. efforts on the rationale that they have taken the
principles of distinction and proportionality into account: Drone attacks are limited
to military objectives, eschew civilian populations, and are formulated to produce
the least possible damage on civilian centers whenever possible.340 Thus, for Koh,
drone killing is legitimate under international law both as an argument about the
rights of states to defend themselves and as an argument about the proper scope of
legitimate fighting in armed conflict.341 Koh's transition between the two strategies
is presented seamlessly.
In contrast with scholars who feel that the conflict with al Qaeda is either
outside the wartime paradigm or is simply a poor fit, Koh affirmed the relevance
and applicability of the Charter's jus ad bellum rules and the jus in bello rules of
the Geneva Conventions.342 A critique Koh is ready to brush aside is that
traditional ideas of international law forbid the very concept of drone killing.343
Koh does not suggest that international law required a facelift or even progressed
in order to now govern drone warfare. Targeted killing has always been legal, at
least since World War II, anyway. Of course, drones were not used in the past, but
this does not pose a problem either: "[T]he rules that govern targeting do not turn
on the type of weapon system used, and there is no prohibition under the laws of
war on the use of technologically advanced weapons systems in armed conflictsuch as pilotless aircraft or so-called smart bombs-so long as they are employed
in conformity with applicable laws of war."344 In fact, Koh suggested, drones are
likely to be better optimized with respect to achieving the most properly
proportional effects on civilian populations.
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Koh also objected to the application of a human rights mindset to drone
killing.345 Do drone killings represent a violation of due process or an instance of
extrajudicial killing? Do the victims of drone warfare not enjoy the protections of
human rights instruments? They certainly do, Koh would surely say, if we were
not in the context of an armed conflict.34 6 Here, the argument for a wartime
paradigm trumps arguments for human rights.34 7 Further, human rights strategies
are almost redundant here, since the acceleration of killing technology has
advanced at such a pace that the targets are most assuredly military targets and
these targets are acquired efficiently.348 Similarly, Koh displaces argumentative
strategies based on the U.S. ban on assassinations because the more "relevant"
argument frames the issue as one sounding in war.
But why defend any of these positions? Why choose this side over the
side O'Connell and Alston present? Is Koh more clever? Has he read more
widely? Again, the answer seems to have much more to do with the way Koh's
preconceptual interpretive orientation has already organized the field of argument.
And once it has done the organizing, the wartime framework emerges as a more
likely way of explaining the problem of the legality of drone killing. Is Koh
disingenuous and insincere? There is certainly no reason to think so on the face of
the text, just as there was no reason to make a similar claim about Alston and
O'Connell. What makes more sense is to suggest that Koh makes the moves that
he does because the narrative form into which he has fallen suggests that the
state's right of self-defense will be foregrounded in the story.
Robert Chesney presents a similar illustration.349 Chesney argues that an
attacked state does not have a total right of self-defense to attack nonstate actors on
the territory of a foreign state.350 If the foreign state is able and willing to engage
the antagonist, the injured state should allow the foreign state a chance to
intervene.351 Chesney suggests that arguments are available with respect to
positing an armed conflict between the United States and al Qaeda,352 thus placing
him in the Charter Wartime framework. The question then would turn on more
specific inquiries, such as whether the particular act in question can be
meaningfully connected with the 9/11 attacks, or if it cannot, whether there is
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sufficient intensity of conflict and organization on the part of the nonstate actor to
satisfy the requirements of humanitarian law.35
Chesney also suggests that a finding of an armed conflict on one territory
triggers an assumption that the laws of war should follow that conflict wherever it
might travel.354 Why? In contrast to a formalistic approach that would restrict
legitimate fighting only to those territories where the conflict is sufficiently intense
and organized, Chesney's view is that a more practical sense of the law allows for
states to pursue nonstate aggressors, wherever they are engaged (minding the
limits on the will and capacity of host states).355 Assuming that the injured state
has a strong Article 51 argument, can it respond to its attacker anywhere in the
world? Could the United States justifiably use drones against al Qaeda in France as
well as Pakistan? Chesney's view is that the right of self-defense can be exercised
in any territory where the host state is unwilling or unable to neutralize terrorists,

at least in theory.3 56

Of course, there will be disagreements about which states are unwilling,
unable, failed, or rogue, but the basic proposition should be one in which states are
free to defend themselves against attacks, whatever the origin of those attacks.3 57
This proposition will then be limited to the extent that the host state is rational and
capable of handling the threat and is actually working toward that end.3 58 In the
event that the injured state does attack, its targets should be strictly limited to the
terrorists themselves, avoiding the infrastructure and people of the host state
wherever possible. 3 59 This last point leads Chesney to the question of how the right
of self-defense should be implemented, after any objections regarding the
territorial integrity of the host state have been resolved. Chesney concludes that the
injured state's exercise of military power must conform to the requirements of
necessity and proportionality defined by the jus in bello.3 6 0
Obviously, Chesney's configuration of the argumentative terrain is quite
different than Alston and O'Connell's. When Chesney looks at the materials, the
image is one of sovereigns, some strong, some weak, some rational, and others not
so much. This image of a sovereign free-for-all is foregrounded, and many of the
subsidiary questions about the relevance of the Charter, the relevance of nonstate
actors to the Charter's provisions, and the relevance of the ICJ's jurisprudence and
human rights law are backgrounded. Of course, Chesney could take the image
further, and push the Charter and the ICJ off the image completely. But he does
not, which is why I still take his narrative as representative of the explanatory form
found in the Charter Wartime framework.
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To sum up, the Charter Wartime framework has the following
characteristics. First, the jurist has decided that the choice between the wartime
and peacetime models is not all that hard, and that the wartime framework makes
the most sense when dealing with questions about drone strikes and al Qaeda.
Second, this choice is prefigured by the jurist's interpretive orientation. For
scholars like Koh and Chesney, there is little interest in highlighting the ICJ's
jurisprudence and the applicability of human rights law. With that said, and while I
have not emphasized this aspect of the discussion, it is also the case that a statist
orientation could move againstthe Wartime framework, rather than lead the jurist
toward it. That is, the explanatory form of the Charter Wartime framework will
emerge in the foreground of the statist orientation when the jurist has chosen the
sovereign right of self-defense as a trump over the sovereign right of selfdetermination. Third, the Charter Wartime framework reduces the relevance of
human rights law, and as the jurist has less and less sympathy for the human rights
orientation, human rights law may be excluded in its entirety. The restrictions of
humanitarian law continue to be in play, and wartime increasingly takes on a sense
of normality. Finally, as constrained by a reasonable application of humanitarian
limitations, drone killing of al Qaeda members may be legal.
Summary of Orientations& Frameworks
Communitarianism

Individualism

Statism

*The ICJ and the
U.N. Charter Are
the Orienting
Concepts for
Thinking About
International Law
*Likely to Lead to
the Charter
Peacetime
Framework
*High Threshold for
Self-Defense Under
UN Charter
*Drone Strikes
Likely to be Illegal,
but Uncertain

*The Indiviudal Is
the Orienting
Concept for
Thinking About
International Law
*Likely to Lead to
the Charter
Peacetime
Framework
*Killing May Never
Be the Sole
Purpose of State
Action
Drone Strikes Very
Likely to Be Illegal

The Sovereign Is
the Point of
Departure in
Thinking About
International Law
May Lead Either to
Charter Peactime
or Charter
Wartime
Frameworks
Strong Arguments
for and Against
Self-Defense Are
Equally Plausible
Drone Strikes May
Be Legal

III. THE JUDGE AND THE DRONE
In this Part, I bring together the structuralist approach to legal
interpretation and the law of killing in a hypothetical adjudication of a drone strike.
The essential point I highlight is the tension at the heart of Dworkin's project in
Law 's Empire. It is a tension between the jurist'sfreedom to make various choices
along a chain of legal reasoning on the one hand, and on the other the constraints
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forcing that chain into certain twists rather than others. In the discussion that
follows, I show how a judge's work on the legality of drone strikes should be
understood as an iterative process in which a distinctly legal structure is constantly
operated through ideological influence. Consequently, this presentation aims to
neutralize the three "mistakes" in international law discourse I described in Part
I.D. First, the judge will find himself legally constrained in ways that proponents
of the "it's all politics" point of view disregard. Second, the judge will enjoy far
more freedom than proponents of the "it's all law" perspective recognize. Third,
the judge will confront the concept of sovereign rights as providing arguments
both in favor of and against the plaintiff, rather than encountering a dilenuma
between sovereignty and human rights.
The discussion also foregrounds the semiotic and rhetorical elements
canvassed in Part I. In particular, the hypothetical judge that I will personify will
prefigure the field of legal materials in an ironic mode.361 As a tropological
orientation, White described irony as a self-conscious prefiguration of the field,
which means that the person doing the prefiguring is fully aware that there is no
one true way in which to collect and categorize the materials.362 There are many
ways, and while some are wrong, there is no manifestly correct form of argument.
In this sense, this Article's structuralist orientation has been ironic, casting the
different ways of narrativizing the law of killing as just that-different, not right
and wrong ways. Some modes will be more edifying, more instructive, and
morally more desirable. But so long as a mode is conforming to the formal
requirements of the langue, no one mode is more correct than another. To recap,
here is a figure of langue,parole, and its liminal structures.

Parole (LglArgument
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A. Two Judges, Two Mistakes
Anthony and Ricardo are appellate judges and longtime friends.3 63 Now
in their golden years, the two like-minded jurists find themselves at the peak of
their power, as fluent in the history of American legal thought as they are nimble
in the exercise of technical argument. But despite their friendship, Anthony and
Ricardo often find themselves in a recurring debate. Their conflict turns on the
problem of legal interpretation-interpreting the facts, 3 64 interpreting statutes, 365
interpreting the decisions of prior cases. 3 66 It is a disagreement about what it means
for a judge to look out at the universe of legal materials, cabin and collect it in
some way, and transform that material into a legal argument and conclusion.
In Judge Anthony's view, a judge's interpretive orientation is necessarily
constrained by the contents of the materials being interpreted. For Anthony, there's
really very little of this "cabining and collecting" of the legal materials. It is
already ready, waiting for him, at least most of the time. It is for this reason that
some certain interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment are better than others,
since those better interpretations pay better respect to the Amendment's text. Or,
some interpretations of the history of the French Revolution are better than others,
since these interpretations carry more sophisticated understandings of the
Revolution's players, causes, and so on. According to Anthony, an interpretation
of either the historical or the legal kind is constrained by the textual materials and,
of course, the wit of the person doing the interpreting. There is, more often than
not, an answer out there in the material, and the judge's role is to find it and apply
it. To be sure, Anthony is happy to concede, historical and legal analysis are not
"scientific" in the fashion of physics or chemistry. But they are not in the category
of literature either. 367
As fond of Anthony as Ricardo is, he believes this to be an
embarrassingly bad way of understanding how judges actually work. For Judge
Ricardo, a text has no meaning whatsoever prior to the reader's act of interpreting
the text. There is nothing "out there" waiting in the materials to provide the judge
with an answer. In fact, there is nothing in a legal text that can constrain
interpretation at all. Texts have no meaning unless and until they have been read.
Neither the French Revolution nor the Fourteenth Amendment has any literal
363.
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meaning that might be set against the meaning offered by an Eric Hobsbawm or an
Akhil Amar.368 For Judge Ricardo, adjudication is highly discretionary. It's up to
the judge to decide which materials to collect and cabin, and to decide what sort of
story to make out of those materials. A legal text only takes on the appearanceof
being highly constrained when someone like Judge Anthony brings his own
preferences into the picture and masquerades them as principles that had been
lying in the text all along.
Now, it might seem plausible that Ricardo has gotten the better of
Anthony, were it not for the fact that we all know that Ricardo is wrong. The field
of legal argument is not radically indeterminate, since there obviously are better
and worse readings of certain texts. After all, Ricardo seems to suggest that
anything goes when it comes to interpreting a set of materials, whether the object
of analysis is a novel, an archive, or a stack of judicial decisions. But surely it is
nonsense to suggest that anything goes, since it never does. If Ricardo interprets
the Fourteenth Amendment as the joint work product of Bugs Bunny and Elmer
Fudd, or suggests that its proper meaning is to restrict government action only
when such action is of a religious sort, we are unlikely to be persuaded. But why?
Must it be that Anthony has got it right, and that there really is some inherent
meaning in the Amendment's text, and an essential way of accounting for its
origin?
A judge operating under the structuralist orientation described in the
foregoing Parts of this Article would reject both Anthony and Ricardo's
understandings of legal indeterminacy and judicial interpretation. In the act of
interpreting a mass of material, whether it lie in the telling of a history or crafting a
judicial decision, we face neither a choice between strong discretion nor a strong
form of meaning preceding us, dictating the conclusion in advance.369 The
structuralist understands that Dworkinian attempts to secure a middle way or
mediation between subjective and objective forms of interpretation are always
misconceived, precisely because neither the subjective nor objective accounts are
actual possibilities. Interpretive practice is itself a "structure of constraints, a
structure which, because it is always and already in place, renders unavailable the
independent or uninterrupted text and renders unimaginable the independent and
freely interpreting reader."370
Consequently, the judge does not choose between personal freedom and
impersonal constraint, and could not even if she wanted. The constraints that
constitute interpretive practice are always, in the first instance, personal, and the
very notion of a personal preference is already a reflection of communal norms.371
Oddly enough, while Anthony and Ricardo were wrong in their separate ways,
they approach rightness in combination. As has been argued above, interpretation
is impersonal to the extent that the interpreter is always prefigured by constraints
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prior to his voluntary preferences, and at the same time always free to follow those
prefigured preferences wherever they might lead.
B. An Ironic Adjudication
In the hypothetical that follows, I will imagine myself as a judge oriented
toward this structuralist posture, and one pushing against Anthony and Ricardo's
interpretive positions. The result, I believe, is a more self-consciously fluid and
ironic disposition in which the legal materials are encountered in terms that are
simultaneously indeterminate and constraining. As with most legal hypotheticals,
the case draws substantially on real-world events, blending the facts of an actual
complaint submitted to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in
2012,372 recent developments in the Middle East that have become generally
known as the Arab Uprisings,373 and the consequent emergence of an
ultraconservative Nur party in Egypt.374 One reason that I see this as a helpful
hypothetical is that it explicitly draws attention to a state and political party that
are clearly not relevant to the Administration's present construction of "al Qaeda
and associated forces." In other words, my intention is not at all to suggest that
Egypt is or should be thought of as a "hot" battlefield. The point is rather to
examine how the current argumentative structure of the law of killing is quite
easily manipulated to accommodate legal questions that go "beyond al Qaeda."375
372.
See Complaint, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 1:12-cv-01192-RMC (D.D.C. July
18, 2012); Robert Chesney, Reactions to the ACLU Suit. There is Armed Conflict in Yemen,
and the US is Party to It, LAWFARE (July 18, 2012, 12:48 P.M.), http://www.lawfare
blog.com/20 12/07/reactions-to-the-aclu-suit-there-is-arned-conflict-in-yemen-and-the-usis-party-to-it/; Stephen A. Vladeck, Al-Aulaqi and the Futility (and Utility) of Bivens Suits
in National Security Cases, ACSBLOG (July 23, 2012), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/alaulaqi-and-the-futility-and-utility-of-bivens-suits-in-national-security-cases.
373.
See generally Daniel Kanstroom, "Passed Beyond Our Aid:" U.S.
Deportation, Integrity, and the Rule of Law, 35 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 95 (2011);
Margaret MacMillan, The Arab Uprisings: How Did We Get Here?, Address to the Council
on Foreign Relations (Mar. 30, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.cfr.org/middleeast/arab-uprisings-did-we-get-here/p27840).
374.
On Egypt's Salafist Nur party, see Khalil al Anani, "Egypt: The New
Puritans," in THE ISLAMISTS ARE COMING: WHO THEY REALLY ARE (Robin Wright ed.,
2012); Will McCants, The Lesser of Two Evils: The Salafi Turn to PartyPolitics in Egypt,
BROOKINGS (May
2012), available at http://www.brookings.edul~/media/research/
files/papers/2012/5/01%20salafi%20egypt%20mccants/0501salafi egypt mccants.pdf
375.
See Robert Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond al Qaeda: The

Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism (U. of Texas Law, Public Law
Research Paper No. 227, 2012), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract-id=2138623##. In a recent interview, CIA director John Brennan Spoke to
this issue. Transcript: CIA Director John Brennan Says His Agency Has Done Nothing

Wrong, WASH. PosT (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/transcript-cia-director-john-brennan-says-his-agency-has-done-nothing-wrong/
2014/03/11/21dldde8-a944-11e3-8599-ce7295b6851cstory.html ("There are a lot of other,
though, groups, you know, throughout the region that may have an ideological affinity with,
sort of, al- Qaida, but have not sworn bayat, do not follow their direction and guidance,
pursue a Salafist, even Takfiri sort of agenda. It's a loose confederation of groups, and as
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Imagine a U.S. Air Force pilot, sitting in a darkened control room at
Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico.376 The pilot sits alone before the glow
of a large monitor, hand at the joystick, watching the video feed of a Reaper
hovering somewhere over Pakistan or Libya or maybe even Egypt.377 The pilot
gets the green light to launch, and at the squeeze of a trigger in New Mexico, a
human being 6,000 miles away dies at the other end of a Hellfire missile.378
Next, imagine that a claim has been brought against several members of
the Executive branch, including the U.S. Secretary of Defense, the Commander of
Joint Special Operations Command, and the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency. The plaintiff is Harold Pickles, a U.S. citizen residing in Boulder,
Colorado. Pickles's sixteen-year-old son, Peter, was invited to a youth conference
hosted by the American University in Cairo, Egypt. Peter made a side trip to
Alexandria, and while dining at an open-air restaurant, he was killed in an
explosion that the United States subsequently explained to have been the result of
a drone strike. The strike was directed at a known terrorist, Omar Abdel-Rahman,
commonly known as "The Blind Sheikh."379 Recently released from a U.S. prison,
Abdel-Rahman joined up with newly elected officials in Egypt's Nur party. Harold
Pickles's claim, as personal representative of the estate of his son Peter, is that
Peter was deprived of his life by U.S. actors, in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
I will imagine myself as a federal judge sitting in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Colorado in Denver, and describe the interpretive work as I think
I would experience it. What do I know so far?
*

There is the occurrence of a U.S. drone strike.

*

There is the death of a U.S. citizen as a result of the strike, on foreign soil.

*

The question is whether the strike was legal.

*

There are likely other material facts relating to the question of the strike's
legality, and which I will need to identify.

you point out, you know, al- Qaida has metastisized and -- which makes it all the more
challenging, because a lot of these groups have local agendas, but also are being exploited
by al-Qaida core for more sort of violent global jihadist purposes. So, the, you know,
Islamic extremism and terrorism -- the Salafi, Takfiri sort of dimension, has some political
implications, clearly, with -- you know, a number of the countries in the Arab Spring are
dealing with that, but the violence that is attendant to a number of these groups is very, very
challenging. And that's why I pointed out that building up the capacities and capabilities of
our partners really is going to be the key to success here.").
376.
Mark Mazzetti, The Drone Zone, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jul. 6, 2012, at
MM32.
377.
Id.
378.
See David Kilcullen & Andrew McDonald Exum, Death from Above,
Outrage Down Below, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 17, 2009, at WKJ3; Jane Mayer, The Predator
War: What Are the Risks of the CIA. 's Covert Drone Program?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 26,
2009, at 36.
379.
Omar Abdel-Rahman, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OmarAbdelRahman (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

186

[VOL. 56:117

As a judge, I will need to identify a body of law that will persuasively
explain why the strike was legal or illegal. It is not immediately obvious what this
body of law might be. I will also need to survey and collect other facts of material
relevance. But how? There is a lot of law out there, spread throughout a huge
domain of apparently diverse and unrelated legal materials. And how will I choose
among the facts? How far back in time should I go? No doubt, precedent will be
instructive. But I will first need to figure out what counts as precedent, and in all
likelihood once I do I will find that the authority of these decisions will be limited
by other decisions. The narrative that will form the backbone of the legal argument
is not going to simply proclaim itself. But then from where should the narrative
line come? How should I choose?
Thinking about these questions, I wonder how my friends Anthony and
Ricardo might go about all of this. It strikes me that they will be in exactly the
same position, one difference being that Anthony will believe that there is an
answer out there waiting for him. I do not think that is right. Similarly, Ricardo
would suggest that the most sensible way to move forward through the material is
merely to select the most reasonable or practical path. That does not strike me as
making much sense either, given the highly elastic nature of what might count as
reasonable or practical. Besides, I suspect that reasonableness is too low a
threshold of decision-there will be some conclusions that seem more persuasive
than others regardless of the criterion of reasonableness. In any case, whether you
are of the mind that the right answer is out there waiting for you, or you believe
that practical considerations will be determinative, we are all in the same boat: We
have to get on with the work of actually sifting through the materials.
Once I begin, assuming that the plaintiff is able to persuasively eliminate
what would be some substantial jurisdictional hurdles, I immediately notice a
creeping sensation. I start to worry about what I think will be a likely gap between
my own preferences in favor of the plaintiff, and my sense that the relevant law is
against him.380 I think about this for a moment, and do a double take. I have
already made a mistake. Why do I have a sense that the law is against the plaintiff,
and that there is a gap between such a law, preexisting my own interpretive work,
and my preferences for how the law ought to be? Where did this gap come from?
Is it really there? To think that there is a gap is already to presume that there is a
narrative in the legal materials waiting for me. This is Anthony's approach, which
I already know to be wrong.
Nevertheless, the specter of a gap keeps nagging at me. Why? On the one
hand, I am aware of my general disposition in favor of both the individualist and
communitarian positions. I also know that I am disposed against the idea that the
United States should be free to execute American citizens abroad without due
process of law. Recognizing these dispositions is helpful, since it is obvious that
there is nothing legally obligatory about my having or not having them. To put it
another way, there is nothing in this prefigurative stage of the legal reasoning
process that might tell me in an objective way whether I should be more inclined

380.

Kennedy describes the "panic" in this situation, supranote 21, at 523.
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toward human rights law or the laws of war. My gut feeling here is to find for
Pickles. His claim is heart-wrenching: He has lost his son, and it just seems wrong
that he should have died this way. Justice seems to be on Pickles's side here, so I
want to be as well. Is it possible to see how justice might be on the side of the
drones? Sure, but I am not inclined to do so. That just is not the way the story
seems to want to be told.
On the other hand, knowing something of the legal fields in play, I
suspect that the United States has a great deal of discretion here, and that while the
death of the boy is tragic, it may be difficult to conclude that it was actually illegal.
While I have a preference to find in favor of the plaintiff, I have a feeling that the
law will push me in favor of the United States. Sensing Judge Anthony's
positivism hovering overhead, I have a feeling that this case is "governed by a
rule" that I do not like. This awareness of a gap between my preference and the
law is important, for at least two very different reasons. One is that I do not want
to be overturned on appeal, and so I know that I cannot just decide in favor of
finding a constitutional violation if it is unlikely that any of my colleagues will
agree. Another reason has to do with the obvious fact that some legal arguments
are weaker than others, and my genuine desire as a judge is to generate holdings
that are arguably right. Some legal arguments just do not let you get to certain
conclusions, and I do not want to find myself making an obviously ideological
error.
With this intuition about an apparent gap between my preferences and the
likely outcome, as well as the intuition that gaps are the ghostly fabrication of
positivist fairy tales, my working position is deeply ironic. As much as I can, I
shake off the worry about a rule governing the case-my worry about a hostile rule
was, after all, simply a first impression-just a feeling. And no lawyer worth his
salt draws conclusions based on first impressions. Work must be done in order to
identify a whole constellation of rules that seem relevant. No rule will govern the
case until I make my decision-then and only then will a rule govern the case, a
rule that I have chosen. In this view, the notion of a gap seems to fade again-at
least, it fades away at this very initial phase of the work.
Acknowledging that my possibly unconscious preferences have already
shaped the field in such a way as to foreground those arguments that will be more
favorable to the plaintiff (and also acknowledging that such a prefiguration is only
one among many ways to do it), my task appears to be one in which I need to
figure out a way to find for the plaintiff, but in a convincing way. I realize that
there are a number of choices in front of me with respect to forming an argument.
There are no precedents on all fours, and this initial research sweep discloses that
the question very quickly turns into whether the strike was an incident of war. If I
decide that it was, then I see how easy it will be to move into the explanatory
apparatus of the Charter Wartime framework. If I decide that it was not, I can
move into the Charter Peacetime framework, which is where I would rather be. Or,
in contrast with both of these decisions, I could avoid international law altogether
and decide the case purely as a matter of domestic law. Given the absence of any
strict guidance forcing me to ignore international law, and my natural inclination
to find in favor of the plaintiff, I focus on the Charter Peacetime framework. The
next step involves figuring out how to justify the choice to use it, though I do see
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that there is not anything necessarily compelling me in this way, and that the
option to pursue the laws of war is equally available.
My first question: Did Peter pose an immediate danger and concrete
threat to American lives? There is no evidence at all that Peter was the actual
target of the strike, and so his death was only incidental to the U.S. attack on the
Blind Sheikh. The United States would have preferred Peter remain unharmed, but
in its calculus, the strike against the Sheikh was apparently seen as necessary and
proportional. I am unable to make any judgments here one way or the other,
however, unless I know how to define necessity and proportionality, and in order
to know this I need to decide if the strike was an incident of war. But as I already
know, there are different ways to foreground and background particular
interpretations of these concepts. I will need to figure out how to choose.
This impasse leads to my second question: Does the armed conflict
between the United States and al Qaeda extend to Egypt? Should Peter's killing be
understood as collateral damage? Thus far, there are no precedents for such an
extension and no briefings from the State Department, the Department of Defense,
or anywhere else suggesting that this might be the case. The conflict, regardless of
whatever legal status we may bestow upon it, has been limited to Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and arguably Yemen. Further, as explained in President Obama's
address from May 2013, the drone wars seem to be winding down. 381 There is no
question about al Qaeda's presence in certain territories, and we need not rehearse
whether the degree of violence instigated by al Qaeda forces in those territories is
enough to constitute an armed conflict. The question is whether the level of
hostilities in Egypt is enough, and the answer plainly is no. There is no substantial
element of al Qaeda operating in Egypt at all.
Relieved, I start thinking that there is a clear case for slipping into the
Charter Peacetime framework. And to think I was all worked up about that gap. If
there is no colorable claim about the rules of war governing the U.S. strike in
Egypt, then perhaps my early worry about not being able to find for Pickles was
misplaced. Even my less ironic colleagues on the bench would have trouble
finding their way into the laws of war here if there is no credible argument for
extending the armed conflict with al Qaeda into Egypt. If this dispute is properly
characterized as geographically beyond the conflict with al Qaeda, the plaintiff's
chances rise dramatically, as do my own chances of being affirmed on appeal. 38 2
But just as I gain confidence, I receive a memo from a clerk. The clerk
explains that she has researched the background of this particular drone strike, and
the separation between Egypt and the conflict with al Qaeda is murkier than I
thought. I must consider as well the context of the Arab Uprisings and the recent
victories of Political Islam in their wake. 38 3 Citing West Point's Combating
381.
Obama, supra note 226.
382.
At least on these grounds.
383.
Political Islam is a theory of government that counsels its operators to use the
Quran and traditions associated with the Prophet Mohammed as guides for the
constitutional and legislative pillars of the state. See generally, OLIVIER Roy, THE FAILURE
OF POLITICAL ISLAM (Carol Volk trans., Harvard University Press 1998). The most eye-
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Terrorism Center and its "Militant Ideology Atlas," the clerk's extensive memo
explains that adherents of Political Islam, or Islamists, are Muslims desiring the
use of Islamic Law (sharia) as the constitutional structure of a religious state.384
There are many strands of Islamists, and among them are the Salafis. Most
Muslims in the Middle East and North Africa believe in Salafism, which involves
a tradition that instructs its adherents on the necessity of grounding the law of the
state exclusively in the Quran, and in the lived example of Muhammad and the
first three generations of his followers (hadith). However, while Salafis are
committed to extremely conservative and fundamentalist notions about the
exclusive nature of God's law as law of the land (tawhid), Salafis are by no means
required to believe in the use of violence as a means of furthering their ends. This
is rather the view of the jihadi Salafis who interpret the Quran as demanding war
on the nonbelievers.385 Importantly, while all jihadists like those fighting for al
Qaeda-those Muslims claiming holy war on their adversaries, and typically
labeled as terrorists-are Salafis, not all Salafis are jihadists. Thus, where Islamist
groups like Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood might be more likely to trend in favor of
liberal-democratic reforms, Salafis are extreme social conservatives386
"ideologically akin to the medieval Puritan movement in England and America."387
Further, with Mohammad Morsi's recent fall from power, both the Brotherhood
and the Salafis are feeling more dispossessed than ever.388
The clerk's memo is troubling, and it just gets worse. While there is
certainly a sure lack of evidence as to an international armed conflict involving
Egypt, the Obama Administration has been very clear about its adversary: al
Qaeda and its associated forces. There is no reason to think that the Nur party is
organizationally associated with al Qaeda, but the Blind Sheikh has been known as
an incendiary leader in al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, an Islamist organization in Egypt
that the United States has identified as a terrorist network. The problem here, in
making what at first appeared to be a smooth transition into the Charter Peacetime
framework, now involves a tricky question of U.S. foreign policy. If the United
popping example is Egypt. David D. Kirkpatrick, After Victory, Egypt Islamists Seek to
Challenge Military, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2012, at A4; see also THE ISLAMISTS ARE
COMING: WHO THEY REALLY ARE (Robin Wright ed., 2012); Jessica Matthews, President of
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Opening Remarks at Islamists in Power:
Views from Within (Apr. 5, 2012).
384.
WILLIAM MCCANTS, MILITANT IDEOLOGY ATLAS, COMBATING TERRORISM
CNTR. (Nov. 1, 2006), available at http://1ibweb.uoregon.edu/ec/e-asia/reada/aer.pdf.

385.
Thomas Hegghamner, Jihadi-Salafisor Revolutionaries? On Religion and
Politics in the Study of Militant Islam, in GLOBAL SALAFISM: ISLAM'S NEW RELIGIOUS
MOVEMENT (Roel Meijer ed., 2009).
386.
MCCANTS, supra note 384, at 6; see also, Bernard Haykel, On the Nature of
Salafi Thought and Action, in GLOBAL SALAFISM: ISLAM'S NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT
(Roel Meijer ed., 2009).
387.
MCCANTS, supra note 384, at 6.

388.
Edmund Blair, Paul Taylor & Tom Perry, Special Report: How the Muslim
Brotherhood Lost Egypt, REUTERS (July 26, 2013, 6:51 AM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2013/07/26/us-egypt-mistakes-specialreport-idUSBRE96007H20130
726.
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States is now claiming that the armed conflict with al Qaeda and its associated
forces extends to militant Salafi leaders in Egypt like the Sheikh, there is on the
one hand good reason to defer to that judgment. According to the clerk's memo, al
Qaeda and Nur claim a fundamentally similar approach to Islamic government,
and the justified use of violence against so-called heretics.
Compounding my woes, my second clerk has brought me another memo,
outlining the work of prominent international law scholars who have argued
pragmatically for the right of a sovereign state to eliminate foreign threats to its
security when the host state is "unable or unwilling" to deal with that threat
itself.389 The memo also discusses a recently leaked document from the
Department of Justice, similarly espousing an unable/unwilling standard.390 Thus,
on this view, the United States has an inherent right of self-defense that may be
triggered even in the absence of a formally identifiable international armed
conflict. My hopes for Pickles are now almost gone. If the United States has a
solid legal justification for this sort of strike, without proof of the existence of an
international armed conflict, it looks like I would have to make a determination
that the Executive branch has failed to properly articulate its interest and how the
Sheikh was a threat to U.S. integrity. Thus, to the extent that the Executive branch
has determined that the Sheikh's affiliation with al Qaeda-like militancy posed an
immediate and substantial threat to U.S. interests, and that Egypt's govermnentonce again in political tunnoil-has proved either unwilling or unable to nab the
Sheikh, Peter's death seems to fall in an area governed by the discretion of the
Obama Administration. While this line of argument is novel, it certainly has
enough supporters to give me sufficient credibility, were I to choose this path.
Thankfully, however, the memo also points out that these pragmatist
justifications of the new unable/unwilling standard seem to collide head-on with
another, equally strong sovereign rights argument: the sovereign right of Egypt to
be free of any interference with its "absolute and exclusive" right of territorial
autonomy and self-determination. So long as Egypt is recognized as a sovereign
state, and as far as I can tell, neither the United States nor the United Nations has
attempted to undermine Egypt's status in this way, it is difficult to see why or how
the right of the United States to defend its interests should trump the right of Egypt
to territorial autonomy. But it is equally difficult to see why Egypt's sovereign
right should trump the sovereign rights of the United States, or how something like
Judge Ricardo's pragmatism might better counsel in one direction rather than the
other. Depending on the interests that are labeled as the more important ones, and
depending on which "problem" is the better problem to solve, not to mention what
might count as having solved it, pragmatism seems like little more than a
masquerade. These arguments appear equally cross-cutting, but given my
disposition to show a violation here, the Egyptian argument in favor of sovereign
equality is more appealing.

389.
See generally Ashley S. Deeks, "Unwilling or Unable": Toward a
Normative Frameworkfor ExtraterritorialSelf-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 483 (2012).
390.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 222.

2014]

THE JUDGE AND THE DRONE

191

Regrouping, I try to sum up the various positions in order to get a sense
for how I will be able to go about crafting my opinion in detail. I begin by noting
the substantial amount of freedom I appear to enjoy. There are clearly a number of
ways to go. There is no rule governing this case somehow existing prior to my own
interpretive work. There was never a gap, despite my worries. There were only
first impressions and hunches, and certainly good judicial work is much more than
that. The rule that I feared would be against me only emerged in the context of my
work-it was never out there, preceding me. Acknowledging this apparent
freedom to maneuver, I then encountered the availability of two ways to explain
the legality of the strike. I can adjudicate the claim in the context of cross-border
law enforcement, or I can adjudicate the claim as an incident of war. Separately, it
seems like I could bypass the U.N. Charter altogether if I take arguments about the
unable/unwilling standard seriously.
However, as I moved deeper into the research, I noticed the availability of
certain narrative currents attempting to carry me into one or another of these
frameworks:
(1) If I focus on the question of whether there is a traditionally defined
international armed conflict between Egypt and the United States, or between
any of the Blind Sheikh's affiliations and the United States, I have to struggle
to find one. This fact pushes me toward the Charter Peacetime framework, and
the likely conclusion that Peter's death was unjustifiable in terms of
preventing an immediate and concrete threat to human life.
(2) If I focus on the nature of the deep ideological connections between Salafism
and al Qaeda, however, the possibility of whether Peter's death is implicated
in the "armed conflict with al Qaeda and associated forces" becomes harder to
reject.
(3) If I focus on the inherent right that the United States enjoys to self-defense, I
can avoid the question of an armed conflict altogether, but at the same time I
might focus on the Egyptian right of nonintervention, which appears to collide
with the U.S right of self-defense in the same way as an unstoppable force
collides with an unmovable object.
While it strikes me as easily debatable which of these routes seem like the
right way to tell the story, I cannot help but visualize the legal materials in the way
that my prefigurative interpretive orientations demand. Due to my combination of
individualist and communitarian orientations, the field lays out in such a way that
it foregrounds arguments leading me toward the Charter Peacetime Framework. I
will argue first that there is no international armed conflict between the United
States and Egypt, and that the armed conflict between the United States and al
Qaeda does not extend to the Blind Sheikh's activities with Egypt's Nur party.
This will then lead me to a question of whether, under human rights law and the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Peter's death was necessary and
proportional to a U.S. interest in eliminating an immediate and concrete threat to
human life. In the alternative, I will argue that the U.S. deployment of a drone on a
mission to kill a person residing in Egyptian territory was a violation of Egypt's
sovereign right of nonintervention, as well as Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. I
will nod in the direction of the Executive branch's discretion to make foreign
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policy decisions, but I will counter with language about the role of the Judicial
branch and the important work of checks and balances.
I realize that my decision in the case will be vulnerable on appeal, but it
strikes me that whichever way I go here, I will be vulnerable on appeal. I then get
to work, constructing the rule that will govern this case.
CONCLUSION
This Article has brought a structuralist perspective to the law of killing.
To do so, it began with a review of the relation between semiotics and rhetoric.
Semiotics was described in the terms given it by Ferdinand de Saussure and
Claude Levi-Strauss, and rhetoric was described in the terms given it by Hayden
White. With this structuralist perspective in place, the discussion reviewed White's
analysis of the distinction between history and literature, and then used that
analysis as a predicate for thinking about the distinction between law and politics.
In both cases, the distinction between history and law and between literature and
politics traded on a binary relation between objectivity and subjectivity.
Structuralist analysis rejects this dichotomy, and offers an epistemological mode
rooted in the notion of style, a shorthand for a kind of knowledge production that
asserts a truth value mirroring neither the apodictic appearance of positivist
science nor the imaginary appearance of the arts.
A structuralist perspective on international law claimed to resolve three
chronic problems in its conventional discourse. These were the tendency to dismiss
international law as nothing but politics, to regard international law as formally
autonomous from politics, and to think of sovereignty and human rights and
community as polarities. This perspective confronted the first problem by
highlighting the constraining effect of international law as a language-system-an
effect in play in all language-systems, international law included. It confronted the
second problem by highlighting the discretionary and political aspects of parolethe discretionary crafting of legal argument. It confronted the third problem by
highlighting the idea that sovereignty is itself a language-system, spoken in
recurring and contradictory modes.
The Article brought these insights to a special domain in the language of
international law: the law of killing by drone. It began by following Mark Kelman
and Pierre Schlag's work on interpretive orientations, and more specifically,
Hayden White's structure of tropological orientations: metaphor, metonymy,
synecdoche, and irony. In the context of the law of killing, jurists tend to prefigure
the field of legal argument through one of four interpretive positions. These are
realism, communitarianism (synecdoche), individualism (metonymy), and statism
(metonymy plus metaphor). These interpretive orientations prefigure the field in
such a way that they foreground the explanatory reasonableness of one legal
framework rather than another. The two dominant frameworks are the Charter
Peacetime and Charter Wartime frameworks. Depending on which framework a
jurist chooses as the explanatory mode for his narrative, certain materials emerge
as necessary to the conclusion. This effect was illustrated through a brief survey of
the work of four respected scholars of international law: Phillip Alston, Mary Ellen
O'Connell, Harold Koh, and Robert Chesney.
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The Article concluded by exploring a hypothetical case of drone killing in
Egypt. This exploration was intended to serve a number of tasks. First, it sought to
illustrate the structuralist (ironic) orientation of interpretive configuration. The
judge claimed to be very sensitive to the individualist and communitarian
orientations, but also seemed very conscious of the fact that there was nothing
actually right about them. His prefiguration was, as a consequence, much more
fluid than would be the case for a judge that either had never reflected on his
preconceptual attitude, or believed his attitude to be correct in some way. In this
ironic mode, there is substantial tension between the judge's work in the direction
of crafting a single narrative and the judge's apprehension that the narrative is
fragile at best.
Second, the hypothetical highlighted the three problems of international
law and showed how they are problems only from a mistaken point of view. The
judge's foray into the material disclosed that international law was neither all
politics nor all law. This just did not seem to be the right way to think about what
was happening at all. At first, the judge seemed dogged by an anxiety about a gap
between his politics and the law standing out there, waiting for him. This was the
gap he feared might open up in between the way he wanted the case to come out
and the way the law would force it to come out. But such a gap was mostly
illusory. There was no rule awaiting the judge; this much was clear. Rules only
emerged through his active construction of the legal field. And they only emerged
as a consequence of his inevitable and unavoidable prefiguration of the field, and
still further, they only emerged in the forms that they did as a result of the
narrative demands of the available explanatory frameworks. There was no rule
waiting to be applied, just as there is no history waiting out there to be told. The
rule and the history alike require a construction, and the construction is never a
purely political act or a formally legal one. It is an act that is at once wholly
constrained and discretionary. Understanding this is to see the crafting of a legal
argument as an instance of language-performance, and not as an act either in the
mode of judicial activism or judicial fidelity.
Third, the hypothetical focused on the manner in which sovereignty itself
functions as a subsystem in the broader grammar of international law. As the judge
navigated the field, sovereignty never emerged as a position against which could
be countered the human rights perspective, or the interest in peace. The
individualist position, for example, aligned nicely with sovereignty when the
sovereign right to self-determination was in play. And while the example did not
go in this direction, it would be equally plausible to align the sovereign right to
self-defense with human rights. Sovereign rights are, after all, based on a
metaphor. They are rights attributed to an object known as the state because we are
meant to assume deep similarities between that object and another rights-bearing
object: the human being.
These rights, conventionally elucidated in the canonical texts of liberal
political theory, are famously in tension. To foreground this tension, as well as the
metaphor that brings it to light in the context of sovereign states, should not be
mistaken for nihilism. What it does demand, however, is our attention to the
following: To the extent that law is indeed helpfully described as a languagesystem, and to the extent that the language-system is commonly spoken in the
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vernacular of liberal theory, we should be wary of liberal legalism's fundamentally
contradictory granmar. If we do not like the fact that our language is so
conditioned, and if we really do not like that it is so conditioned in fields as deadly
as the law of killing, perhaps it is time to learn a new language.

